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Selling Land and Religion
Eang L. Ngov*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of decades, thousands of religious monuments have
been donated to towns and cities. Local, state, and federal governments
now, as a result of Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,1 have greater
freedom to accept or reject religious monuments, symbols, and objects2
donated to them for display in public spaces without violating the Free
Speech Clause of the Constitution.3 In Pleasant Grove City, the city
displayed a donated monument of the Ten Commandments in its public
park but rejected a monument of the Seven Aphorisms donated by
Summum, a religious organization.4 The Supreme Court characterized
displays of monuments in public spaces as government speech, which
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1. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
2. This Article uses the terms “object” and “symbol” interchangeably to refer generally to
permanent structures, like monuments, as opposed to temporary holiday displays.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”).
4. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 464–65.
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allows the government to select the message it wants to express.5
Applying the government speech doctrine, the Court upheld the city’s
actions against a Free Speech Clause challenge because the Free Speech
Clause implicated government regulation of private speech, not
government speech.6
Since the city embraced the Ten Commandments monument as its
own speech, the question arose whether the city violated the
Establishment Clause7 in displaying a religiously significant monument.
The Court, however, did not address the constitutionality of the city’s
actions under the Establishment Clause because Summum did not raise
that issue.8 In anticipation of this issue, Justice Scalia reassured the city
that its victory would not “propel[] it from the Free Speech Clause frying
pan into the Establishment Clause fire.”9
Fearing an Establishment Clause violation, some governmental
bodies have sold religious monuments, objects, symbols, and the land
under them to private parties when confronted with an Establishment
Clause challenge.10 Other governmental bodies have exchanged or

5. See id. (“[T]he placement of a permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a
form of government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.”).
6. See id. at 467.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
8. See Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 482 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating the parties argued
the case under the Free Speech Clause, not the Establishment Clause). The city was essentially put
in a position to “pick its poison” between the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause.
Chief Justice Roberts precisely framed the dilemma when he questioned counsel for Pleasant Grove
City during oral arguments: “[Y]ou’re really just picking your poison, aren’t you? I mean, the more
you say that the monument is Government speech to get out of the first, free speech—the Free
Speech Clause, the more it seems to me you’re walking into a trap under the Establishment Clause.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (No. 07-665); see also
id. at 63 (oral argument by counsel for respondent) (“I do think that the—the city is a bit on the
horns of a dilemma because it wants to have it both ways. It wants to be able to say this speech is
governmental for purposes of blocking equal access rights; but not so governmental at that it’s a big
Establishment Clause problem.”).
9. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 482 (Scalia, J., concurring).
10. See, e.g., Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011) (attempting sale
of Latin cross on public land to private association), cert. denied sub nom. Mount Soledad Mem’l
Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012); Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 694 (7th
Cir. 2005) (selling portion of city park with Ten Commandments monument to private service
organization); Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th Cir.
2000) (selling Christ statue and underlying city land to private organization); Chambers v. City of
Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (D. Md. 2005) (selling parcel of land with Ten Commandments
monument to a private organization following suit by ACLU); Kassandra J. Slaven, Comment, A
Cross-Examination of the Establishment Clause and Boise’s Table Rock Cross, 45 IDAHO L. REV.
651, 652–53 (2009) (discussing the sale of a sixty-foot cross erected on Table Rock in Boise).
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transferred the land beneath religious objects to private parties pursuant
to federal law. Some transactions have included restrictive covenants
that require the buyer maintain the religious object.11 Others have sold or
transferred the religious object and its underlying land to the original
donor without soliciting bids from other buyers12 or to a party despite the
existence of a higher bid.13 In some circumstances, the religious object’s
original installation14 or the subsequent land transactions violated
controlling law.15 Part II of this Article describes the circumstances in
which governments have employed land sale, land transfer, and eminent
domain to resolve Establishment Clause violations.
One such case of land privatization was Salazar v. Buono, where the
federal government transferred to a private party public land in a national
park, on which stood a Latin cross, in exchange for land from the private
party.16 The Court, as a whole, did not consider whether the land transfer
extricated the federal government from an Establishment Clause
violation.17
This Article explores whether the transfer or sale of religious objects
and the land underlying them to private hands saves the government
from the Establishment Clause fire, a question left unanswered in
Buono.18 It provides an in-depth analysis of five cases in which
governmental bodies resorted to privatizing public land to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause and a broader doctrinal and
theoretical critique of this practice. It argues that, under all proposed
standards used in religious display cases, government disposition of

11. E.g., Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 771 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
12. E.g., Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1103; Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 771; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at
490.
13. E.g., Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
14. See, e.g., Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769 (constructing cross on federal land without proper
permit).
15. See, e.g., Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572 (selling land without following city land
transaction guidelines).
16. 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010) (plurality opinion). For an explanation of the complex
litigation history of this case, see infra note 108.
17. See id. at 1815–16.
18. Cases involving disposition of religious objects can result from either a government
assumption that the object itself will be found to violate the Establishment Clause or an actual
judicial determination that such an object on government land indeed violates the Establishment
Clause. This Article proceeds on the assumption that continued display of such an object on public
land violates the Establishment Clause; thus, the purpose of this Article is to explore whether
privatizing the land and religious object can end Establishment Clause violations.
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religious objects along with the public land beneath them violates the
Establishment Clause.
The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been plagued
with inconsistency19 because the Court has been “unwilling[] to be
confined to any single test or criterion.”20 Consequently, this Article
examines the constitutionality of such land transfers and sales under a
number of competing Establishment Clause standards and theories.
Because religious display cases are the most analogous to land
disposition cases involving religious symbols, Part III provides a brief
discussion of Establishment Clause standards used in religious display
cases, namely the Lemon test, endorsement test, and Van Orden v.
Perry’s21 “legal judgment” approach.
Both the Lemon and endorsement tests consider the government’s
purpose for engaging in the challenged action and the action’s effect on
the legally constructed reasonable observer.22 To pass these tests,
government action must be grounded in the pursuit of a secular purpose
and must not endorse or disapprove of religion.23 Although the plurality
in Van Orden found little use for the Lemon test,24 Part III concludes that
the legal judgment approach, fostered by Justice Breyer,25 closely
resembles the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon and endorsement
tests. Therefore, this Article proceeds by adopting the Lemon and
endorsement tests as viable standards in light of Van Orden.
19. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, 132 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.) (describing Establishment Clause jurisprudence as being “in
shambles”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 619 (1992) (“Our precedents may not always have
drawn perfectly straight lines.”); Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1010 (W.D.
Wis. 2004) (“[T]he Court has struggled to set forth a consistent framework for addressing questions
under the [E]stablishment [C]lause, as even the Court itself has recognized.”), rev’d sub nom.
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005); Steven G. Gey, Religious
Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 464 (1994) (“[T]he Court has left
a constitutional muddle with a series of unsatisfactory and unclear standards and outcomes.”);
William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 495, 497 (1986) (“The Court itself has acknowledged its own ‘considerable internal
inconsistency,’ candidly admitting that it has ‘sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for flexibility,’
and commentators have found the area hopelessly confused.” (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted)).
20. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
21. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
22. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 864–66 (2005).
23. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (articulating a three-prong test to
evaluate challenges under the Establishment Clause); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
24. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion).
25. See id. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Part IV specifically considers the potential governmental purposes
for the land disposition in determining the existence of a secular interest:
providing memorials, avoiding a show of disrespect to religion, and
avoiding Establishment Clause violations. The government has most
frequently justified land privatization to preserve religious objects that
were installed as a memorial or commemorative object, purportedly to
promote civic-mindedness or recognize the heroism of veterans.
Although these are laudable goals, these objectives are not uniquely
connected to the religious symbol.
Additionally, the government has objected to removing the religious
object for fear of showing disrespect toward religion. The government
overlooks two problems when it makes this objection. One problem is
that the government fails to show an equal concern about the disrespect
shown to other religions or to nonbelievers when the government insists
on keeping the religious symbol. The other problem is that the
government, by using the symbol for a secular event, offends devout
followers who revere the sacred symbols. Part IV argues that the
purported government purposes are secondary to a religious interest
because the government can achieve its objectives without resorting to
land disposition.
Parts V and VI examine the effect that land disposition has on the
“reasonable observer” who is aware of the history of the religious object
and land disposition.26
Privatizing religious symbols and their
surrounding land has the effect of advancing religion by securing the
retention of religious objects through private land ownership. Further,
restrictive covenants that require the private owner to maintain the
symbol and reversionary clauses that allow the government to reclaim
the land perpetuate state action and excessively entangle the government
with religion. This Article concludes that governmental bodies cannot
avoid the Establishment Clause fire by any means other than removing
the religious object.
The intent of this Article is not to attack religion but to protect it by
preventing governmental bodies from diluting the meaning of sacred
religious symbols through their secularization. At the same time, the
purpose of this Article is to argue for greater inclusiveness in public
spaces for religious minorities and nonbelievers. By prohibiting
government expression of religious preferences through land dispositions
26. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 (noting that reasonable observers view objects within a
historical context).
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that have been undertaken to preserve religious objects, which often
reflect the majoritarian religion, religious believers and nonbelievers can
equally participate in public spaces.
II. THE LAY OF THE LAND
In recent years, there has been a trend among governments to resort
to land sale, eminent domain, and land transfer to resolve Establishment
Clause violations.27 Because Establishment Clause jurisprudence is factdriven and context sensitive,28 this Part provides a detailed elaboration of
the types of land disposition cases that implicate the Establishment
Clause.

27. See, e.g., Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding federal
exercise of eminent domain to seize land on which a cross was erected violated Establishment
Clause), cert. denied sub nom. Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012);
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding sale of land
beneath Ten Commandments monument against Establishment Clause challenge); Kong v. City &
Cnty. of San Francisco, 18 F. App’x 616, 617 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (upholding
city’s auction of land beneath a cross as a resolution for Establishment Clause challenge); Freedom
From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492–96 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding sale of
Christ statue and land beneath it to private owner did not violate Establishment Clause, but visual
conditions of park created a continuing perception of government endorsement in violation of the
Establishment Clause); Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (D. Md. 2005)
(validating sale of land containing Ten Commandments monument to original donor organization);
Summum v. Duchesne City, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1229 (D. Utah 2004) (upholding land sale to
family that originally donated the Ten Commandments monument), rev’d, 482 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir.
2007), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009); Slaven, supra note 10, at 652–56 (discussing the sale of land
under an illuminated sixty-foot cross erected on Table Rock in Boise).
28. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that Establishment
Clause analysis “must take account of context and consequences”); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000) (“Every government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693–94 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring))); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (“Our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
remains a delicate and fact-sensitive one . . . .”); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 629 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“To be sure, the endorsement test
depends on a sensitivity to the unique circumstances and context of a particular challenged
practice . . . .”); Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1018 (W.D. Wis. 2004)
(“Establishment [C]lause cases are notoriously context sensitive.”), rev’d sub nom. Mercier v.
Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
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A. Land Sales
1. The Statue of Christ in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. City
of Marshfield
One common approach used to resolve Establishment Clause claims
involves land sales. In City of Marshfield, the city sold a statue of Christ
and the surrounding land in response to an Establishment Clause
challenge to the city’s display of the statue.29 Although the bid met state
requirements for public land sales30 and reflected fair market value,31 the
city did not solicit any other bids32 and included in the sale a requirement
that the land be used for a public park.33 After the sale, the statue
remained in the public park, visible to drivers entering the city on a state
highway.34 The city discontinued provision of electrical services to the
park and erected a sign disclaiming the religious message of the statue.35
Subsequently, the plaintiffs complained that the sale was a sham to
evade the Establishment Clause.36 The Seventh Circuit applied a
presumption that “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, a sale of real property
is an effective way for a public body to end its inappropriate
endorsement of religion.”37 Because the restrictive covenant did not
violate state property law, the Seventh Circuit concluded there were no
extraordinary circumstances that would warrant voiding the sale.38
Although the court upheld the sale, it recognized the obvious religious
message of the statue of Christ and found the government lacked a
secular purpose for the statue.39
The court concluded that the sale did not change the nature of the
park, which retained its public forum character even under private
29. Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th Cir.
2007). In 1959, the city accepted a white marble statue of Christ standing on a sphere with his arms
open in prayer. Id. at 489. The base of the statue bears the following inscription in twelve-inch
block letters: “Christ Guide Us On Our Way.” Id. For a picture of the statue, see FLICKR,
http://www.flickr.com/photos/32441465@N00/172129898 (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
30. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490.
31. Id. at 492.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 490.
34. Id. at 489. For a map of the statue’s location, see id. at 500 fig.C.
35. Id. at 489–90.
36. Id. at 490.
37. Id. at 491.
38. Id. at 493.
39. Id.
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ownership.40 The court considered the historical use of the property as a
public forum, its dedication for public purposes, the location of the statue
in relation to the park, and the statue’s visibility to the public.41 The
property had been used as a public park and public forum, and the
restrictive covenant requiring the continued public use reinforced the
property’s public forum status despite the sale.42 The statue’s location
and its lack of physical partition, coupled with the factors previously
discussed, magnified the perception that the statue rested on public
property.43 The disclaimer posted by the city did not mitigate this
perception.44 The court concluded, therefore, that a reasonable person
would interpret the circumstances to convey governmental endorsement
of a religious message.45
The Seventh Circuit, however, signaled that the city could remove
the perception of continued government endorsement by constructing a
fence or wall to separate the private property on which the statue now
rests from the city’s property.46 On remand, the district court ordered the
city to erect a four-foot high fence around the monument.47
2. The Ten Commandments Monument in Mercier v. Fraternal Order
of Eagles
Similarly, in Mercier, the city disposed of its land through a sale to
cure an Establishment Clause challenge of a monument of the Ten
Commandments that had rested in a public park for almost forty years.48
The city had dedicated the monument to commemorate the volunteer
efforts of high school students during a flood.49

40. Id. at 494–95.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 494.
43. Id. at 494–95.
44. Id. at 495.
45. Id. at 495–96.
46. Id. at 497.
47. Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, No. 98-C-270-S, 2000 WL 767376,
at *1 (W.D. Wis. May 9, 2000). The district court also ordered a specific disclaimer sign. Id.
48. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2005). The granite
monument consisted of an inscription of the Ten Commandments, an eagle grasping the American
flag, and the “all-seeing eye.” Id. at 694–95. For photographs of the monument and a map of the
park, see id. at 707–11. For additional description and history of a similar monument, see Books v.
City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294–96 (7th Cir. 2000).
49. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 696. Approximately 5,500 stone monuments of the Ten
Commandments were dispersed throughout the United States as a part of a promotion of the movie
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Twenty years after its installation, the monument sparked
controversy, and litigation ensued over whether the monument’s
presence violated the Establishment Clause.50 In an effort to remedy any
Establishment Clause violations, three organizations made offers to the
city: (1) the local Eagles chapter, which had originally donated the
monument, offered to take back the monument and place it in a location
visible to the public; (2) an Episcopal church offered to move the
monument; and (3) the Freedom From Religion Foundation offered to
move the monument to another location.51 Rather than accept the offers
to move the monument, the city sold the monument and a parcel of land
on which the monument rested to the local Eagles chapter.52 The city
sought no other bids but sold the land for fair market value.53 Ten days
prior to completion of the sale, litigation arose challenging the sale as
violating the Establishment Clause by favoring the monument’s religious
message.54
On review, the Seventh Circuit upheld the land sale.55 The court was
persuaded by a number of factors: the city had a historical reason for
retaining the monument; it was practical to sell the land to the Eagles due
to the chapter’s headquarters being located close to the monument; the
land was not located near the seat of government; the monument was not
located in a prominent part of the park; and the city and Eagles erected
fencing and signs disclaiming government sponsorship.56 The court
determined that the city had a secular purpose for both accepting the

The Ten Commandments. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569 (D. Md. 2005).
Many cities displayed the Ten Commandments monoliths in public parks and near government
buildings. Summum v. Duchesne City, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1225–26 (D. Utah 2004), rev’d, 482
F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2007), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009). For a sampling of the litigation that
has ensued over monuments depicting the Ten Commandments, see infra note 123. See also Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688–90 (2005) (plurality opinion) (finding that historical meaning of
the Ten Commandments prevented a monument from violating the Establishment Clause); Freedom
From Religion Found. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge constitutionality of Ten Commandments monument in city park); Red River
Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 759 F. Supp. 2d 940, 943 (D.N.D. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge constitutionality of Ten Commandments monument in city park).
50. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 696 (describing a lawsuit in 1985, dismissed for lack of standing,
that alleged the monument violated the Establishment Clause).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 697.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 705–06.
56. Id. at 703–04.
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monument to commemorate the flood volunteers and selling the parcel of
land to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.57 Additionally, the
court held that the sale “did not have the ‘primary or principal effect of
advancing a religion.’”58 The court concluded that a reasonable observer
familiar with the history of the monument would understand the city’s
motivation for keeping the monument in the park and the practical
solution of selling the monument to the Eagles, whose headquarters was
conveniently located across from the park.59
3. The Ten Commandments Monument in Chambers v. City of
Frederick
As in Mercier, in Chambers, the city received an identical monument
of the Ten Commandments from the local Eagles chapter and similarly
relied on selling public land to remedy an Establishment Clause
challenge.60 When litigation over the monument commenced, the Eagles
offered to purchase all or part of the memorial ground on which the
monument rested.61 At least eight other people or organizations
informed the city of their interest to purchase the parcel of land.62 The
city selected a buyer based on the bidder’s ability to pay the fair market
value of the land, willingness to comply with the covenants, and “ability
to maintain the property.”63 The city ultimately sold the parcel to the
Eagles but retained ownership of another nearby monument.64
Although the city failed to comply with standards regulating the sale
of city property and accepted the Eagles’ lower bid, the district court
found there were no “unusual circumstances surrounding the sale of the
parcel of land so as to indicate an endorsement of religion.”65
Notwithstanding the first half of the monument’s religious references,66

57. Id. at 704–05.
58. Id. at 705 (quoting Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 304 (7th Cir. 2000)).
59. Id.
60. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569–71 (D. Md. 2005).
61. Id. at 570.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 570–71.
64. Id. at 571 n.3.
65. Id. at 572 (quoting Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
66. The Ten Commandments inscription stated:
I AM the LORD thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
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the court accepted the city’s assertion that the monument had a secular
purpose “to remind citizens not to bear false witness, to deal fairly and
not covet other[s’] property, and to make the park into a haven of
tranquility.”67 Consequently, the court upheld the sale.68
B. Eminent Domain: The Cross on Mount Soledad
Another method of land disposition governments use in response to
Establishment Clause concerns is the exercise of eminent domain. In
Trunk v. City of San Diego,69 governmental bodies relied on both land
sales and eminent domain to resolve litigation that arose over a Latin
cross70 on top of Mount Soledad.71 The cross stood forty-three feet high
including its base, spanned twelve feet across, and weighed twenty-four
tons72—looming over thousands of drivers who used Interstate 5 and saw

Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord
thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s house.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor
his cattle, nor anything that is thy neighbor’s.
Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2000).
67. Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572–73 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Id. at 573.
69. 629 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v.
Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
70. A Latin cross consists of a horizontal bar joined at the center by a longer vertical bar.
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811–12 (2010) (plurality opinion).
71. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1099. Many cities have accepted donations of crosses permanently
erected on public land. See, e.g., Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d
617 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing a cross built on public land by private parties who later deeded the
cross to the city).
There are other instances of cross displays on public land that have not been litigated. See,
e.g., Slaven, supra note 10, at 654–55 (describing a two-ton, sixty-foot cross that was erected on
Table Rock in Boise in 1956 and later sold, along with the land beneath it, upon impending litigation
to the Boise Jaycees for $100).
72. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1103. For photographs of the cross and the site, see id. at 1126–27 app.
A.
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it from miles away.73 In response to challenges over the cross, the city
twice attempted to sell the cross and underlying land to a private group,
but both sales were invalidated.74 The court invalidated the first land sale
because the city’s failure to solicit other bids showed a preference for
Christianity and a desire to preserve the cross.75 The second sale failed
because it was structured to give an advantage to bidders who desired to
preserve the cross.76
Consequently, in 2004, the city proposed moving the cross to a
church, but the proposal did not receive sufficient voter approval for a
third sale.77 This failed initiative spurred local congressmen to add a
provision to the 2005 budget requiring the federal government to accept
the cross as a donation and designate it as a national veterans’
memorial.78 The city government eventually submitted the issue to the
voters.79 After the ballot initiative received the required voter approval,
yet another court enjoined the donation.80
As a result of this and other unresolved litigation, Congress
intervened again in 2006.81 This time, Congress seized the memorial
through eminent domain “in order to preserve a historically significant
war memorial.”82 Although the cross stood without any objects to
distinguish it as a war memorial until the late 1990s,83 Congress declared
that the site had served as a memorial for veterans for over fifty-two
years.84 Also, the “Act required the Department of Defense . . . to

73. Id. at 1103.
74. See id.
75. Id. To sell the land in accordance with the City of San Diego Charter, the city submitted a
ballot proposition to the voters. Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002).
The proposition stated:
Shall the removal from dedicated park status of that portion of Mt. Soledad Natural Park
necessary to maintain the property as an historic war memorial, and the transfer of the
same parcel by The City of San Diego to a private non-profit corporation for not less than
fair market value be ratified?
Id. at 1126.
76. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1103.
77. Id. at 1103–04.
78. Id. at 1104.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Id. (quoting Preservation of Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial, Pub. L. No. 109-272, § 2(a),
120 Stat. 770, 770–71 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See id. at 1103.
84. Id. at 1104 (citing Preservation of Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial § 1(1)).
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manage the property and enter a memorandum of understanding with the
Association for the Memorial’s ‘continued maintenance.’”85
Following Congress’s exercise of eminent domain, litigation arose
that claimed the federal government’s seizure violated the California and
the United States Constitutions.86 The trial court granted summary
judgment against the plaintiffs.87 On appeal, relying on legislative
statements and the text of the act, the Ninth Circuit held that Congress
had a secular purpose in acquiring the memorial.88 Nonetheless, the
Ninth Circuit, after considering the cross’s context, history, uses, and
dominance, held that the memorial conveyed a message of government
endorsement of religion.89
Trunk presents a unique case where two levels of government were
involved in efforts to preserve a religious symbol,90 and where the
methods pursued included both privatizing the land91 and retaining the
land’s public character.92 In light of the unprecedented, persistent
congressional involvement in maintaining a religious symbol, it is
curious that Congress thought conveyance or outright seizure of a
sectarian symbol and underlying land from one level of government to
another would extinguish an Establishment Clause challenge. After all,
it was government ownership of the sectarian symbol and underlying
land that sparked the controversy in the first place.
C. Land Transfer: The Cross on Sunrise Rock, Mojave National
Preserve
A final method of addressing Establishment Clause challenges
involves land transfers, which occurred in Salazar v. Buono.93 Buono
involved a Latin cross that stood in the Mojave National Preserve, a

85. Id. at 1105 (quoting Preservation of Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial § 2(c)). “The
Association” refers to the Mount Soledad Memorial Association, a civic organization that installed
the cross. Id. at 1103.
86. Id. at 1105.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 1108.
89. Id. at 1125.
90. See id. at 1103–04 (city and federal).
91. See id. at 1103 (selling land to private organization).
92. See id. at 1104 (donating land to federal government and using eminent domain to transfer
land to federal government).
93. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
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national park spanning 1.6 million acres in southeastern California.94
The Veterans of Foreign Wars installed the cross on top of Sunrise Rock,
along with wooden signs stating “The Cross, Erected in Memory of the
Dead of All Wars,” and “Erected 1934 by Members of Veterans of
Foregin [sic] Wars, Death Valley post 2884.”95 The original cross, as
well as subsequent replacements, was installed without permission96 in
contravention of park regulations.97 In its most recent form, the cross
stood alone without any signs.98 The cross, standing less than eight feet
high,99 was visible 100 yards away from a road passing through the
preserve. 100
In 1999, the National Park Service received a request to erect a
Buddhist stupa101 on the outcropping near the cross.102 The Park Service
denied the request, warning that “[a]ny attempt to erect a stupa will be in
violation of Federal Law and [will] subject you to citation and/or
arrest.”103 The National Park Service acknowledged that “[c]urrently
there is a cross on [a] rock outcrop located on National Park Service
lands” and committed in writing its “intention to have the cross
removed.”104
Before undertaking the cross’s removal, the National Park Service
researched whether the cross and memorial site would qualify as a
national historic place, worthy of preservation.105 But the Park Service
concluded that the cross and memorial site were ineligible because the
current cross was not the original, and the site had been used for religious
purposes.106 In 2000, Congress responded to the National Park Service’s
anticipated removal of the cross by passing a law that prohibited the use

94. Id. at 1811.
95. Id. at 1812.
96. Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
97. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.62(a) (2012) (prohibiting unauthorized “installation of a monument,
memorial, tablet, structure, or other commemorative” object).
98. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812.
99. Id.
100. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769.
101. A stupa is a Buddhist shrine shaped like a dome. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 769 (alteration in original). Federal law prohibits “[t]he installation of a monument,
memorial, tablet, structure, or other commemorative installation in a park area without the
authorization of the Director.” 36 C.F.R. § 2.62(a).
104. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769 (alterations in original).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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of federal funds to remove the cross.107 In 2001, Frank Buono, a former
National Park Service employee, challenged the retention of the cross.108
In January 2002, during the pendency of the district court case, Congress
designated the cross as a national memorial and required the Secretary of
the Interior to use federal funds to “acquire a replica of the original
memorial plaque and cross placed at the national World War I
memorial.”109
In July 2002, the district court found the cross violated the
Establishment Clause and permanently enjoined the display of the
cross.110 Three months after the district court’s injunction, Congress
passed another bill prohibiting use of federal funds “to dismantle national
memorials commemorating United States participation in World War
I.”111 During the appeal of the case in September 2003, Congress passed
a bill authorizing an exchange of the public land beneath the cross at
Sunrise Rock for private land from Henry Sandoz, who had erected the
current cross.112 This legislation required the recipient owner Veterans
of Foreign Wars to maintain the property as a memorial, or the property
would revert to the United States.113
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court’s decision was
limited to resolving, as Justice Breyer viewed it, “a very technical boring
issue”114 of whether the district court’s injunction against implementation
of the land exchange statute was proper.115 Because the government did

107. Id. (citing Consolidated Appropriations Act-FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114
Stat. 2763, 2763A-230 (2000)).
108. Buono v. Norton (Buono I), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2002). As a
result of four different cases, Buono’s procedural history is complex. Buono I and Buono II centered
on the constitutionality of the cross. The district court invalidated the display in Buono I, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed in Buono II, Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004). Buono III and
Buono IV addressed the remedy; the district court in Buono III, Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d
1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005), and the Ninth Circuit in Buono IV, Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th
Cir. 2008), concluded that Congress’s land transfer failed to cure the Establishment Clause violation.
109. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 770 (quoting Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(a)–(c), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 771 (quoting Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248,
§ 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551 (2002)).
112. Id. (quoting Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, §
8121(a)–(f), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003)).
113. Id.
114. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472),
available at http://supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-472.pdf.
115. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1815–16 (plurality opinion).
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not appeal the ruling that the cross had the primary effect of advancing
religion, res judicata prevented the Court’s review of the underlying
conclusion that the cross violated the Establishment Clause.116
Although there were six separate opinions, only three directly
addressed the merits.117 Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice
and, in part, by Justice Alito, sensitive to the government’s dilemma
between violating the injunction by maintaining the cross or showing
disrespect for veterans by removing it, accorded legislative deference to
the land transfer.118 While the plurality intimated that the land
disposition adequately settled Establishment Clause concerns,119 it
ultimately remanded the case to the district court to determine if
knowledge of Congress’s “policy of accommodation,” manifested by the
land transfer, would affect a reasonable observer’s perception.120 Justice
Alito, in his separate concurrence, was convinced that the government
properly resolved Establishment Clause claims through the land
transfer.121 The dissent, however, was skeptical of the government’s
motive and argued that the land transfer was an inadequate Establishment
Clause remedy.122
III. STANDARDS FOR RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has often been described as
“muddled” because there is no one prevailing standard and the Court’s
inquiry relies heavily on context.123 The Establishment Clause cases

116. See id. at 1815.
117. See id. at 1811, 1815–21; id. at 1821–24 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1828–45 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
118. See id. at 1817 (plurality opinion).
119. See id. at 1817–18.
120. See id. at 1818–21.
121. Id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring).
122. See id. at 1830–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). After twelve years of litigation, the district
court approved a settlement agreement reached by the parties. The Veterans of Foreign Wars will
receive the one acre of land surrounding the cross in exchange for land as specified in the land
transfer act. The National Park Service agreed to erect a fence around the property and install signs
to indicate it is private property. The National Park service will install a replica of the original
plaque but may not install a replica of the cross. Land will not revert back to the United States.
Although it is permitted to mention the memorial in its brochures, the National Park Service may not
install other plaques or markers referring to the memorial. Settlement Agreement, Buono v. Salazar,
No. 5:01-CV-00216-RT-SGL (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.
com/doc/91124039/Sunrise-Rock-Settlement-Agreement.
123. For example, the ambiguity in Establishment Clause jurisprudence and reliance on context
has led to conflicting results regarding the Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal
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involving religious displays lend the most analogous comparisons to land
disposition cases because land dispositions often involve religious
displays. In the context of religious display cases, the Court has applied
three tests: Lemon test, endorsement test, and “legal judgment” approach.
A. Lemon Test
At the heart of the Court’s tests in religious display cases are the
questions of governmental purpose and the effect of governmental
action. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, this inquiry was encompassed in a three-

Order of the Eagles to various cities, even though the monuments are identical. See Susanna
Dokupil, “Thou Shall Not Bear False Witness”: “Sham” Secular Purposes in Ten Commandments
Displays, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 640 (2005); see also Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 779–804 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a presumption of unconstitutionality of
Ten Commandments monument, but concluding that the monument had an effect of government
endorsement, without directly addressing whether government had a secular purpose); Card v. City
of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1019–21 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding city had secular purpose in
displaying Ten Commandments monument and no violation of Establishment Clause); ACLU Neb.
Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (upholding Ten
Commandments monument as not contravening the Establishment Clause); Adland v. Russ, 307
F.3d 471, 489–90 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s finding that Ten Commandments
monument display advanced a religious purpose); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1000
n.3 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he fact that Anderson considered an identical Ten Commandments
Monument is not necessarily controlling. . . . Nor, particularly in light of Allegheny’s fact-intensive
inquiry, does the fact that Salt Lake City’s Ten Commandments Monument [in Anderson] did not
have an improper effect establish that the City of Ogden’s Monument was not likely to have such an
improper effect.”); Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 771–73 (7th Cir. 2001)
(invalidating display of Ten Commandments monument because of religious purpose and effect of
conveying a religious message); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 306–07 (7th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that Ten Commandments monument was displayed for a religious purpose and that it
advanced religion); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 34 (10th Cir. 1973) (accepting
the Ten Commandments display for the secular purpose of reflecting the history of United States and
Utah laws and finding no Establishment Clause violation), abrogated by Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677 (2005), and McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 855 (2005); ACLU v. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 444 F. Supp. 2d 805, 815–16 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (finding secular purpose and no
governmental endorsement of religion); Twombly v. City of Fargo, 388 F. Supp. 2d 983, 983
(D.N.D. 2005) (finding secular purpose in display of Ten Commandments monument); Chambers v.
City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (D. Md. 2005) (finding secular purpose and no
impermissible advancement of religion in Ten Commandments display); Russelburg v. Gibson
Cnty., No. 3:03-CV-149-RLY-WGH, 2005 WL 2175527, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 7, 2005) (upholding
Ten Commandments display in light of Van Orden); Summum v. Duchesne City, 340 F. Supp. 2d
1223, 1226 (D. Utah 2004) (“The outcome of these Establishment Clause challenges varied from
court to court and circuit to circuit.”), rev’d, 482 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2007), vacated, 555 U.S. 1210
(2009); Christian v. Grand Junction, No. 01-CV-685, 2001 WL 34047958, at *5 (D. Colo. June 27,
2001) (upholding Ten Commandments display by denying preliminary injunction); Kimberly v.
Lawrence Cnty., 119 F. Supp. 2d 856, 873 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (invalidating Ten Commandments
display as violation of Establishment Clause); State v. Freedom From Religion Found., 898 P.2d
1013, 1026–27 (Colo. 1995) (upholding Ten Commandments display).
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part test: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’”124 Using this test, the Lemon
Court invalidated state aid to church-related schools because although
the state had a secular purpose for providing aid to parochial schools,125
the regulations excessively entangled the state through comprehensive
state surveillance needed to ensure that the subsidy would be used only
for secular education.126 Although the Lemon test has its critics127 and
has at times been completely disregarded,128 it has not been overruled.129
B. Endorsement Test
The Lemon test was eventually refashioned by Justice O’Connor into
the endorsement test. The endorsement test focuses on whether the
124. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted). For an excellent discussion of secular
purpose, see Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 94 (2002) (clarifying the
meaning of secular purpose and responding to objections raised against the secular purpose
requirement).
125. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
126. Id. at 616.
127. See, e.g., Cnty. of Alleghney v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655–56
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (providing cases that criticize the Lemon
test).
128. Justice Thomas has catalogued the Court’s treatment of the Lemon test:
Some of our cases have simply ignored the Lemon or Lemon/ endorsement formulations.
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons–Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604
(2002); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150
L.Ed.2d 151 (2001); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019
(1983). Other decisions have indicated that the Lemon /endorsement test is useful, but
not binding. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L. Ed. 2d 604
(1984) (despite Lemon’s usefulness, we are “unwillin[g] to be confined to any single test
or criterion in this sensitive area”); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741, 93 S. Ct. 2868, 37
L.Ed.2d 923 (1973) (Lemon provides “no more than helpful signposts”). Most recently,
in Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677, 125 S.Ct. 2854, a majority of the Court declined to apply the
Lemon /endorsement test in upholding a Ten Commandments monument located on the
grounds of a state capitol. Yet in another case decided the same day, McCreary County
v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–866, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162
L.Ed.2d 729 (2005), the Court selected the Lemon /endorsement test with nary a word of
explanation and then declared a display of the Ten Commandments in a courthouse to be
unconstitutional. See also Van Orden, supra, at 692, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (SCALIA, J.,
concurring) (“I join the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE because I think it accurately
reflects our current Establishment Clause jurisprudence—or at least the Establishment
Clause jurisprudence we currently apply some of the time”).
Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, 132 S. Ct. 12, 14–15 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of cert.).
129. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 n.7 (1993).
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government acts in a manner that endorses or disapproves of religion.130
Under this test, a government act violates the Establishment Clause if the
government’s “actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion[,] . . . [and if,] irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the
practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval.”131
The endorsement test is concerned with the perception of
government endorsement as seen by a reasonable observer who is “more
informed than the casual passerby.”132 The test does not focus on “the
perceptions of particular individuals or saving isolated nonadherents
from the discomfort of viewing symbols of a faith to which they do not
subscribe.”133 Additionally, by not focusing on “the actual perception of
individual observers, who naturally have differing degrees of
knowledge,” the endorsement test, as Justice O’Connor argued, “creates
a more collective standard to gauge ‘the “objective” meaning of the
[government’s] statement in the community.’”134 Justice O’Connor’s
reasonable person is derived from tort law and embodies a person “who
‘is not to be identified with any ordinary individual, who might
occasionally do unreasonable things,’ but is ‘rather a personification of a
community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective]
social judgment.’”135 The endorsement inquiry does not ask “whether
there is any person who could find an endorsement of religion, whether
some people may be offended by the display, or whether some reasonable
person might think [the state] endorses religion.”136

130. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Focusing on
institutional entanglement and endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an
analytical device.”).
131. Id. at 690.
132. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
133. Id.
134. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690).
135. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 175
(5th ed. 1984)).
136. Id. at 780 (alteration in original) (quoting Am. United for Separation of Church & State v.
City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1544 (6th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Evaluating the effect of the government’s action from the reasonable observer’s perspective
has prompted much criticism. Scholars have noted that the reasonable observer standard has led to
inconsistent rulings in the lower courts. See, e.g., Jesse Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status
and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 513–14 (2002) (discussing the manipulability of the reasonable
observer construct and that the outcome of cases depends upon the characteristics attributed to the
reasonable observer). Professor Steven Smith has pointed out that “invoking a fictional observer as
the arbiter of meaning merely turns disputes about ‘what the law means’ into more byzantine
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Some have interpreted the endorsement test as a separate or
alternative test to the Lemon test, while others have understood it as part
of the Lemon test.137 For practical ease, this Article applies the
endorsement test in conjunction with the Lemon test.
C. “Legal Judgment” Approach
Another approach to resolving cases involving religious symbolism
evolved in Van Orden v. Perry, where the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a monument of the Ten Commandments displayed on
a state capitol’s public grounds that contained sixteen additional

disputes about just what sort of character the fictional observer is, or about what this fictional
character would perceive.” Steven D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudence and the Depletion of
Meaning, 60 MD. L. REV. 506, 561 (2001).
For example, it is unclear if the reasonable observer is a member of the mainstream religion or
minority religion or atheist. The reasonable observer’s religious affiliation may change the analysis
of the effect of the government’s actions. “[I]f this individual is a member of the religious (or
political) mainstream, there is too great a risk that the perspective ‘will be inadequately sensitive to
the impact of government actions on religious minorities, thereby in effect basing the protection of
religious minorities on the judgment of the very majority that is accused of infringing the minority’s
religious autonomy.’” Choper, supra, at 511 (quoting, Note, Developments in the Law: Religion and
the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1648 (1987)).
Additionally, Justice Stevens has criticized the reasonable person as conceptualized by Justice
O’Connor:
[H]er reasonable person is a legal fiction, a personification of a community ideal of
reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment. The ideal human
Justice O’Connor describes knows and understands much more than meets the eye. Her
“reasonable person” comes off as a well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-law
model. With respect, I think this enhanced tort-law standard is singularly out of place in
the Establishment Clause context. It strips of constitutional protection every reasonable
person whose knowledge happens to fall below some “ideal” standard.
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Instead of protecting only the ‘ideal’ observer,” Justice Stevens
advocates “extend[ing] protection to the universe of reasonable persons and ask[ing] whether some
viewers of the religious display would be likely to perceive a government endorsement.” Id.
137. Mark Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement, and the Marsh Wild
Card, 40 IND. L. REV. 529, 556 (2007); see also, Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1106
(9th Cir. 2010) (“In recent years, the Supreme Court essentially has collapsed [Lemon’s] last two
prongs to ask ‘whether the challenged governmental practice has the effect of endorsing religion.’”
(quoting Access Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007))), cert. denied
sub nom. Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012); Mellen v. Bunting, 327
F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e then apply the Lemon criteria, treating the endorsement test as
a refinement of Lemon’s second prong.”); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 479 (6th Cir. 2002) (“We
treat the endorsement test as a refinement of the second Lemon prong.”); LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, LAW
AND RELIGION: CASES AND MATERIALS 62 (2d ed. 2010) (introducing “the endorsement and
coercion tests as alternatives to Lemon”).
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monuments and twenty-one historical markers.138 Adding to the
confusion in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the plurality believed
the Lemon test was “not useful” in this particular circumstance139 and
held that the monument did not violate the Establishment Clause.140 The
plurality dismissed the Lemon test because of the passive nature of the
monument and the country’s history of governmental recognition of the
influence of religion in American life.141
Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which controlled in this plurality
opinion, shed little light on the proper approach courts should use for
reviewing religious symbolism cases. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer
tried to distance himself from the Lemon and endorsement tests by
“rely[ing] less upon a literal application of any particular test”142 and
espousing “the exercise of legal judgment.”143 His legal judgment
approach included “reflect[ing] and remain[ing] faithful to the
underlying purposes of the Clauses and . . . tak[ing] account of context
and consequences measured in light of those purposes.”144
D. Which Test is Controlling?
The Lemon and endorsement tests remain viable standards for
evaluating religious display cases. Although Van Orden declined to
apply these tests, McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky,145 which was decided on the same day, not only embraced the
three-factor Lemon test146 but also reinvigorated it with a more
demanding standard.147 In McCreary, the Court invalidated the display
138. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
139. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion).
140. Id. at 691–92.
141. Id. at 686.
142. Id. at 703–04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 700.
144. Id.
145. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
146. Id. at 859; see also Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, 132 S. Ct. 12, 15 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (“[I]n . . . McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Ky., the Court selected the Lemon/endorsement test.” (citations omitted)).
147. See Edith Brown Clement, Public Displays of Affection . . . for God: Religious Monuments
after McCreary and Van Orden, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 235–36 (2009) (discussing
McCreary’s shift of Lemon’s purpose prong from “the search for a genuine, secular motivation to the
hunt for a predominantly religious purpose” (quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at 902 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Vincent Phillip Munoz, Thou Shalt Not Post the
Ten Commandments? McCreary, Van Orden, and the Future of Religious Display Cases, 10 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 357, 390 (2006) (“Not only is Lemon back, it possesses renewed vigor and
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of the Ten Commandments posted on courthouse walls because the
government, despite having modified the display several times to include
a broader array of historical documents, acted with a predominately
religious purpose.148 Rather than discarding Lemon, as the dissent urged,
McCreary appeared to impose a heightened Lemon standard: “If the
government’s proffered secular purpose is not genuine, then the
government has no secular purpose at all.”149
Recently, the Buono plurality relied on the endorsement test, as
evidenced by its urging the district court to consider the reasonable
observer’s perception in light of Congress’s accommodation policy.150 In
that case, Justice Kennedy specifically “require[d] the hypothetical
construct of an objective observer who knows all of the pertinent facts
and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its placement.”151
Even after Van Orden, most appellate courts continue to apply
Lemon’s three-prong test.152 Among the sixteen religious display cases
decided by the federal courts of appeals since Van Orden,153 “only two

meaning.”).
148. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 881.
149. Id. at 901 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819–21 (2010) (plurality opinion).
151. Id. at 1819–20. It is possible that Justice Kennedy alluded to the reasonable observer
because of the district court’s adoption of this construct, but he did not depart from or criticize the
lower court’s reliance on the reasonable observer construct.
152. Clement, supra note 147, at 246; see also Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of
Religious Symbolism after McCreary and Van Orden, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93 (2007) (surveying
federal circuit court responses to Van Orden and McCreary in religious symbolism cases).
153. See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 972 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying
Lemon test); ACLU of Ohio Found. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 431 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that
Lemon remains the law governing Establishment Clause cases); Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629
F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that application of either test would yield same result), cert.
denied sub nom. Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012); Am. Atheists v.
Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1117 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (stating that Establishment Clause
analysis remains the three-part Lemon test); ACLU of Ky. v. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d 837, 844–48
(6th Cir. 2010) (applying modified version of Lemon test); Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d
479, 494 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that Lemon test is still primary means of evaluating Establishment
Clause challenges to religious displays); Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 796
(10th Cir. 2009) (stating that court was obliged to follow Lemon test as refined by Justice
O’Connor); Winbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1030 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that
Lemon test remains touchstone for Establishment Clause analysis); Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d
1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008) (accepting application of Lemon test generally but not applying it in
instant circumstances); Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing
original trial court litigation that was decided under Lemon test), amended and superseded on denial
of reh’g by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct.
1803 (2010); Access Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that
Lemon test “remains the benchmark to gauge whether a particular government activity violates the
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have expressly declined to apply Lemon, and both did so on extremely
narrow grounds.”154
Perhaps courts continue to rely on the Lemon and endorsement tests
after Van Orden because Van Orden’s own analysis resembles the
inquiry encompassed in these tests.155 Despite his professed resistance to
following Lemon, Justice Breyer’s Van Orden analysis, in practical
effect, shows consideration of the purpose and effect factors found in the
Lemon and endorsement tests.156
First, Justice Breyer’s evaluation of context and history157 is akin to
the Lemon and endorsement tests’ effects prong, which also takes into
account history and context. He rested his conclusion that the
monument’s display on public land was constitutional on the display’s
context—the physical setting of the monument—and history.158 The
monument’s location in a park with sixteen secular monuments and
twenty-one historical markers negated any implication of religious
activity.159 Justice Breyer also found it significant that the display

Establishment Clause”); Staley v. Harris Cnty., 461 F.3d 504, 515–16 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that
the “Lemon test remains the benchmark for reviewing the constitutionality of a monument of public
property”), dismissed as moot en banc, 485 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2007); Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 449 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2006) (reviewing the district court’s application of the Lemon
test); Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 16 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the Lemon test); ACLU
of Ky. v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (continuing to apply the Lemon test
following recent Supreme Court decisions); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d
772, 778 n.8 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (expressly rejecting Lemon test); Soc’y of Separationists v.
Pleasant Grove City, 416 F.3d 1329, 1241 (10th Cir. 2005) (reversing and remanding for further
factual inquiry following recent Supreme Court decisions); O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d
1216, 1224 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that Lemon test remains law until overruled by Supreme Court
and applying Lemon test with Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test).
154. Clement, supra note 147, at 247 (footnote omitted).
155. See B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the
Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 501–02 (2005) (pointing out that Justice Breyer in Van
Orden used “an analysis that is functionally equivalent to the endorsement inquiry”).
156. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Notably, this inquiry does not dispense with the
Lemon factors, but rather retains them as ‘useful guideposts.’” (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring))).
157. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701–02 (Breyer, J., concurring) (examining the use of the Ten
Commandments’ text and the context of the display).
158. See id. at 701–03.
159. Id. at 702. The other monuments included Heroes of the Alamo, Hood’s Brigade,
Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer Fireman, Terry’s Texas Rangers, Texas Cowboy, Spanish–
American War, Texas National Guard, Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas Pioneer Woman,
The Boy Scouts’ Statue of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor Veterans, Korean War Veterans, Soldiers
of World War I, Disabled Veterans, and Texas Peace Officers. Id. at 681 n.1 (plurality opinion).
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existed for forty years without being challenged.160 Second, he
determined that the monument conveyed a religious and secular moral
message161 that suggested a secular purpose for the display, which
corresponded to the purpose prong of the Lemon and endorsement tests.
Therefore, because a majority of courts have relied on the Lemon and
endorsement tests after Van Orden, and Van Orden itself does not
significantly depart from them, this Article applies these tests to
determine the constitutionality of land dispositions involving religious
symbols.
IV. GOVERNMENT PURPOSE
Both the Lemon and endorsement tests require inquiry into
legislative purpose to determine if government actions comport with the
Establishment Clause.162 Various purposes have been presented to
explain disposition of public land including the maintenance of
memorials and commemorative objects, the avoidance of showing
disrespect to religion, and the avoidance of Establishment Clause
violations. These purposes, however, can be challenged as disingenuous
and unnecessary and can result in outright circumvention of the law.
A. Method of Determining Legislative Purpose
Determining the government’s purpose for disposing of public land
is essential to deciding the constitutionality of such acts. Courts have
discerned legislative purpose from “readily discoverable fact, without
any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.”163 These facts
are evaluated through the perspective of an objective observer who
considers the “text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,
or comparable official act.”164 This objective observer is not only
familiar with the government’s past actions but also “competent to learn
what history has to show.”165 The Court has considered textual changes
160. See id. at 702–03 (Breyer, J., concurring).
161. See id. at 701–03 (referring to the “Commandments’ role in shaping civic morality as part
of [the Fraternal Order of the Eagles’] efforts to combat juvenile delinquency”).
162. For a critique of the motivational approach in religion cases, see John Hart Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1313–27 (1970).
163. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005).
164. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 50 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
165. Id. at 866 (citing Santa Fe, 50 U.S. at 308).
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between prior and subsequent legislation,166 public comments made by
the bill’s sponsor,167 and the government action itself168 to arrive at a
commonsense conclusion about the government’s purpose.169
Although the Court generally accords deference to the stated
legislative purpose, “the secular purpose required has to be genuine, not
a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.”170 In Stone v.
Graham, the Court found a religious objective in legislation requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments in schools.171 Notwithstanding the
government’s avowed secular purpose for posting the Ten
Commandments to illustrate their legal influence, the sacred nature of the
Ten Commandments led the Court to conclude the “pre-eminent
purpose” for the government’s action was “plainly religious.”172 Also, in
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the professed secular
purpose of providing education in music and literature did not alter the
Court’s conclusion that there was a religious objective behind laws
requiring students to recite the Lord’s Prayer and Bible readings.173
Similarly, in Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court rejected the
government’s purported secular purpose behind a law prohibiting the
teaching of evolution unless accompanied with instruction on creation
science.174
While acknowledging the deference accorded to the
government’s stated secular purpose, the Court insisted that the
government’s articulation “of such purpose be sincere and not a
sham.”175 The Court concluded that the government’s purpose was to
advance a religious viewpoint,176 because if the government had truly
been interested in providing comprehensive education, it would have

166. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 58–60 (1985) (inferring purpose from textual changes in
school prayer statute).
167. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–88 (1987) (interpreting statutory text and public
comment to find an illegitimate purpose for a statute requiring instruction in creationism to
accompany evolution teaching).
168. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam) (concluding no secular purpose in
requiring posting the Ten Commandments on school walls); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223–24 (1963) (finding religious purpose in requiring Bible readings in
public schools).
169. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 863.
170. Id. at 864.
171. 449 U.S. at 42.
172. Id. at 41.
173. 374 U.S. at 277–78.
174. 482 U.S. 578, 582, 585–93 (1986).
175. Id. at 586–87.
176. Id. at 594.
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permitted instruction in all theories of human origins without making the
teaching of one theory contingent upon teaching another.177
The Court was equally unconvinced by the government’s purported
secular purpose in McCreary, which changed each time the government
changed its Ten Commandments display.178 For the purpose of showing
the Ten Commandments as a “creed of ethics” and “good rules to live
by,” the government’s initial display included only the Ten
Commandments.179 As the litigation progressed, the government added
another display containing religious passages to show the Ten
Commandments as the “precedent legal code”180 and later added secular
historical documents to show the Ten Commandments as “the foundation
of American law.”181 Notwithstanding the purported secular purpose, the
Court construed the counties’ actions as “reaching for any way to keep
the religious documents on the walls of the courthouses”182 and
concluded that the government acted with a predominately religious
objective.183
These cases demonstrate that when the government’s secular purpose
is a sham or secondary to a religious purpose, the Court has not hesitated
to find the purported purpose illegal, even after giving legislative
deference its due consideration. Therefore, courts should not allow
legislative deference to impede their discerning review of the proffered
legislative purpose for land dispositions.184

177. Id. at 588–89.
178. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 869–73 (2005).
179. Id. at 851.
180. Id. at 853.
181. Id. at 856–57.
182. Id. at 873.
183. Id. at 881.
184. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1840 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Furthermore,
in the Establishment Clause context, we do not accord any special deference to the legislature on
account of its generic advantages as a policymaking body, and the purpose test is not ‘satisfied so
long as any secular purpose for the government action is apparent.’” (quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at
865 n.13)).
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B. Purpose of Land Disposition
1. Maintaining Memorials and Commemorative Objects
a. Lack of Logical Connection and Universality
One secular purpose governments have asserted as a basis for selling
religious objects and the land underneath them to private parties is the
preservation of memorials or commemorative objects.
These
governmental units argue that the religious object serves a secular
purpose by memorializing or commemorating important events, and the
object and land beneath must be transferred or sold to preserve them
from Establishment Clause challenges.185
The problem with this argument is that the symbol being used has no
unique logical or historical connection to the purported secular purpose.
In the specific case of a cross, it is unnecessary to use a cross as a
memorial because “the cross is ‘not a generic symbol of death.’”186
Contrary to Justice Alito’s invoking the imagery of “white crosses, row
on row, that marked the final resting places of so many American
soldiers who fell in [World War I]”187 to suggest the symbolism of the
cross as a memorial, historians have found that the cross is not uniquely
used to memorialize veterans in the United States.188 Moreover, one
single cross does not honor individual veterans—a cross for each
veteran189 does.190 The crosses among the fields of poppies, alluded to
185. Governments frequently advance the provision of a war memorial as a justification for
permanent displays of religious objects, particularly crosses. E.g., Separation of Church & State
Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see also Gonzales v. N.
Twp., 4 F.3d 1412, 1414 (7th Cir. 1993); Jewish War Veterans of the U.S. v. United States, 695 F.
Supp. 3, 5–6 (D.D.C. 1988); Greater Hous. Chapter of ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 222–23
(S.D. Tex. 1984).
186. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. Atheists v.
Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1161 (10th Cir.), amended and superseded on reh’g on other grounds sub
nom. Am. Atheists v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.
Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011)), cert. denied sub nom.
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
187. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1822 (Alito, J., concurring).
188. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1112. Similarly, the Star of David is not a prevalent symbol for
remembering the dead. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at 227.
189. The federal government recognizes service members by customizing individual headstones
to honor each person’s faith. See Headstones and Niche Covers, ARLINGTON NAT’L CEMETERY,
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/FuneralInformation/OrderHeadstone.aspx (last visited Oct. 8,
2012) (“The order for the headstone or niche cover will include the appropriate inscription and
choice of emblem of belief.”). Currently, there are fifty-one emblems, representing a range of faiths,
that can be carved into individual headstones at Arlington National Cemetery, including symbols for
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by Justice Alito, were used as individual grave makers, instead of as a
“universal monument to the war dead.”191 The poppy, as depicted in the
famous poem In Flanders Fields,192 not the cross, became the universal
symbol193 in the United States194 and abroad195 for the foreign wars.196

atheists and Wiccans. See id. (follow “Headstone/Niche Emblems” heading; then follow “Printable
List” hyperlink).
Displaying a cross on an individual headstone does not pose Establishment Clause concerns
because it is private speech, elected by the individual. See generally Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–74 (2009) (discussing differences between private and government
speech).
190. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1836 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1113.
192. I thank Professor Bruce Ledewitz for reminding me of the Great War poem, which reads as
follows:
In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses, row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.
We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.
Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.
JOHN MCCRAE, IN FLANDERS FIELDS AND OTHER POEMS 3 (1919).
193. An article in the military press explains:
Among the rows in the gardens of stone, life and resurrection spring forth in the form of
the red-flowered corn poppy, a common plant in Europe. Canadian surgeon and soldier,
Lt. Col. John McCrae wrote the poem “In Flanders Fields” May 3, 1915, after witnessing
the death of his friend, Lt. Alexis Helmer.
In tribute to the opening lines of McCrae’s poem, Moina Michael vowed in her 1915
poem “We Shall Keep the Faith” to always wear a red poppy as a symbol of
remembrance for those who served in the war. Thus the plant became a symbol for the
dead World War I soldiers.
Army Capt. Dayna Rowden, Little Red Flowers and Remembering Veterans, U.S. DEP’T DEFENSE
(Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=56634.
194. The U.S. Department of Defense has featured several articles on its website that recognize
the long established symbolism of the poppy. See, e.g., Jim Garamone, Veterans Day Honors
Service, Sacrifice, U.S. DEP’T DEFENSE (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.defense.gov
/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66017 (“Until the 1960s, veterans groups used the red poppy as the
symbol of Veterans Day. In Great Britain, it still is.”); Rowden, supra note 193 (“Veterans groups in
England, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United States have adopted the red poppy as not
only a symbol of remembrance of the sacrifice of veterans who have died but of the continued
sacrifice that veterans make in service to their countries.”); Erin Wittkop, Memorial Day 2011:
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Like the cross, the Ten Commandments have been advanced as a
commemoration of civic responsibility197 and similarly lack a connection
with this purported secular purpose. In Mercier, for example, the Ten
Commandments monument and the land underlying it were sold to
preserve the monument as a commemoration of the volunteerism of high
school students who filled sandbags during a flood.198 But there is no
“rational connection” between the Ten Commandments and either the
volunteer efforts of high school students or the original purpose of the
monument.199 The monument was originally conceived to combat
juvenile delinquency by providing a code of conduct for troubled youths
and as a commercial venture by Cecile B. DeMille to promote his movie

Memorial Day Traditions Live On, U.S. DEP’T DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/home/
features/2011/0511_memorialday/memorialintro.aspx (last visited Sep. 30, 2012) (“Many Americans
mark Memorial Day by decorating gravesites with flowers and flags, attending local parades and
donning red poppies of remembrance.”).
195. In Canada, the Department of Veterans Affairs promotes the poppy as its symbol to honor
veterans:
The red poppy is a symbol of remembrance. During the First World War, the poppy was
the only flower that could grow in the ruined fields of France and Belgium. It self-seeded
and so could continue growing year after year. Sometimes it was the only spot of colour
the soldiers saw as the trees and grass were replaced by the shattered trunks and mud of
war. We wear poppies on November 11th to publicly show our respect for and memory
of the Canadian men and women who served and died for peace and freedom all over the
world.
Veterans’ Week 2011 Teacher Guide: Remembrance Symbols Fact Sheets: Poppy, VETERANS AFF.
CAN., http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/teach_resources/vw11-tguide/bookmarks/poppies (last visited
Sep. 30, 2012). As the British Embassy explains, Britain has similarly adopted the poppy symbol.
See Holidays and Traditions, UK IN THE USA, http://ukinusa.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/faqs/holidaystraditions/remembrance-day (last visited Sep. 30, 2012) (“The red poppies represent the poppies that
grew in the cornfields of Flanders where many thousands of soldiers lost their lives in the First
World War. Wearing a poppy—the symbol of remembrance—remains a small yet significant
gesture which helps British people to remember the price of freedom.”).
196. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1113. Perhaps the poppy was widely used as a symbol of the war
because its bright color was a reminder of the spilled blood and its self-seeding represented
regeneration and resilience. See Veterans’ Week 2011 Teacher Guide, supra note 195; The Red
Poppy, N.Z. HISTORY ONLINE, http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/anzac-day/poppies (last visited Sep.
30, 2012) (“McCrae was a Canadian medical officer who, in May 1915, had conducted the funeral
service of a friend, Lieutenant Alexis Helmer, who died in the Second Battle of Ypres (Ieper).
Distressed at the death and suffering around him, McCrae scribbled the verse in his notebook. In a
cemetery nearby, red poppies blew gently in the breeze—a symbol of regeneration and growth in a
landscape of blood and destruction.”).
197. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2005).
198. Id. at 696–97.
199. Mercier v. La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1008 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
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The Ten Commandments.200 Moreover, because approximately 5,500
copies of the Ten Commandments monuments were distributed to
various cities throughout the country,201 there is no special connection
between the monument and the identity of any particular city. Also, the
city’s legislative purpose in preserving the Ten Commandments
monument is suspect because the city accepted the monument long
before the flood happened.202 “Thus, at most, the dedication was an
afterthought. There is no evidence to suggest that the city would have
declined to install the monument if the volunteers had not worked as
tirelessly as they did.”203
b. Expressing Sectarian Preference
Religious symbols inadequately serve as a memorial or
commemoration of secular events not only because they lack universality
as a symbol for the purported purpose but also because they have
potential to exclude others. First, the religious nature of the symbols
preserved through the land dispositions can make nonbelievers feel like
outsiders.
Courts have acknowledged, for example, the Ten
Commandments as being primarily religious. Even in Van Orden, which
upheld the Ten Commandments display, the plurality conceded that “[o]f
course, the Ten Commandments are religious—they were so viewed at
their inception and so remain.”204 Justice Breyer, who provided the
deciding fifth vote in Van Orden, agreed that “the Commandments’ text
undeniably has a religious message, invoking, indeed emphasizing, the
Deity.”205
Second, displays like the cross or Ten Commandments, in addition to
having religious significance, express a sectarian preference. The Ten
Commandments, for instance, favor Judaism, Christianity,206 and

200. See Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294–95 (7th Cir. 2000).
201. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569 (D. Md. 2005).
202. See Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
203. Id.; see also Books, 235 F.3d at 304 (rejecting “avowed secular purpose of recognizing the
historical and cultural significance of the Ten Commandments, issued on the eve of litigation”).
204. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005) (plurality opinion).
205. Id. at 700–01 (Breyer, J., concurring).
206. See Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent
Rationalizations and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211, 1219 (2011)
(explaining that the Ten Commandments monument “explicitly presents the Commandments as
Christians and Jews have always understood them—as the direct Word of God”).
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Islam,207 for which the Ten Commandments is a sacred text.208 Thus,
choosing one version of the Ten Commandments or of a cross
necessarily implicates religious endorsement because it represents
approval of one sect over another.209 For example, in Glassroth v.
Moore, Chief Justice Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court erected a
monument of the Ten Commandments in the rotunda of the Alabama
State Judicial Building.210 The Ten Commandments displayed by Chief
Justice Moore was a Christian version, which partly contradicts the
Hebrew version.211
Similarly, the Latin cross has been described as “one of the most
sacred of religious symbols,”212 “an especially potent sectarian
symbol,”213 “the principal symbol of Christianity around the world,”214 “a
symbol of a particular religion, that of Christianity,”215 and a “symbol of
particular denominations within Christianity.”216 The cross not only

207. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that Islam recognizes the Ten Commandments).
208. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 716 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (holding that the Ten Commandments are a sacred text to the Jewish and
Christian faiths)).
209. See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1299 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[C]hoosing which
version of the Ten Commandments to display can have religious endorsement implications under the
Establishment Clause.”).
210. Id. at 1284.
211. Id. at 1299 n.3.
212. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 771 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
213. Id. at 776 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 792 (Souter, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 798 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (“[T]he church speaks through the Cross . . . .”); Gonzales v. N. Twp., 4 F.3d
1412, 1417 (7th Cir. 1993) (“But we are masters of the obvious, and we know that the crucifix is a
Christian symbol. We reached a similar conclusion about the Latin cross, acknowledging that it is
‘an unmistakable symbol of Christianity as practiced in this country today.’” (quoting Harris v. City
of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1403 (7th Cir. 1991))); ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265,
271 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[The Latin cross] is, indeed, the principal symbol of Christianity as practiced
in this country today.”); ACLU of Ga. v. Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d 1098, 1103
(11th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he [L]atin cross is a universally recognized symbol of Christianity.”); Hewitt
v. Joyner, 705 F. Supp. 1443, 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (“[T]he Latin cross epitomize[s] Christian faith.
In fact, the Latin Cross is the pre-eminent symbol of many Christian religions and clearly represents
the key Christian concept of the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Christ.”), rev’d, 940 F.2d 1561 (9th
Cir. 1991); Mendelson v. City of St. Cloud, 719 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (“The Latin
cross is unmistakably a universal symbol of Christianity.”); Jewish War Veterans of the U.S. v.
United States, 695 F. Supp. 3, 13 (D.D.C. 1988) (“[T]he Latin cross . . . is a readily identifiable
symbol of Christianity.”); Greater Hous. Chapter of ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 234 (S.D.
Tex. 1984) (“That the cross . . . [is] the primary symbol[] for Christianity . . . is beyond question.”).
216. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 798 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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excludes non-Christians, but also other sects within Christianity217 that
do not recognize the cross as their religious symbol.218
The litigation brought by the Jewish War Veterans is an example of
how the cross fails to represent all war veterans and how it can be
perceived to dishonor those veterans whose faiths the cross does not
represent.219 In Trunk, after the federal government seized the memorial
through eminent domain, the Jewish War Veterans—“the oldest active
national veterans’ service in America”—challenged the cross display.220
One veteran expressed:
I don’t know if it is a Christian monument, but it does not speak for me.
I was under Hitler and in a concentration camp and a cross does not
represent me. The Cross does not represent all veterans and I do not
know how they can say it represents all veterans. I do not think a cross
can represent Jewish veterans.221

c. Secular Purpose as a Derivative of Religious Meaning
While maintaining a memorial is a legitimate secular interest,
maintaining a memorial through the use of a religious symbol is not.
Any purported secular purpose for the religious object, like a cross
memorializing self-sacrifice, cannot be divorced from the object’s

217. See id. (“[T]he Latin cross is identifiable as a symbol of a particular religion, that of
Christianity; and, further, as a symbol of particular denominations within Christianity.”).
Some Justices do not view the Latin cross as religious. See Steven Goldberg, The Coming
Demise of the Crucifix, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 277, 278 (2011). Professor Steven Goldberg
explains that an unadorned cross may not be seen as religious symbol to the Catholic Justices
because Catholics generally associate the crucifix as their religious symbol, rather than a plain cross.
Id.
Empirical research reveals that in “religious freedom decisions, the single most prominent,
salient, and consistent influence on judicial decision making was religion—religion in terms of
affiliation of the claimant, the background of the judge, and the demographics of the community.”
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 614
(2004); see also Scott C. Idleman, The Concealment of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking,
91 VA. L. REV. 515, 521–23 (2005) (showing the effect of judicial religious affiliations on various
types of cases).
218. ACLU, MYTHS AND REALITIES: GRAVESTONES AND MARKERS ARE NOT IN DANGER, (July
26, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file399_26244.pdf (“Even within the
Christian faith, many sects do not recognize the Latin cross as their preferred religious symbol.”).
219. See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom.
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1125.

NGOV FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

SELLING LAND AND RELIGION

10/31/2012 1:02 PM

33

religious meaning.222 For example, the cross symbolizes the death of
Jesus Christ,223 and any secondary meaning for the cross is derivative of
that original symbolism.224 In Buono, Justice Kennedy makes a contrary
argument by suggesting that the meaning of the cross is changed when
Congress adopts it as a memorial.225 This argument is perplexing
because it implies that the message or meaning of an object that has
stood for seventy years is subject to change by sudden legislative acts.
Since 1935, the cross has inspired Easter Sunrise services, but never
Armistice Day or Veterans Day services until the litigation
commenced.226
Likewise, Congress cannot erase the cross’s primary meaning or the
history of religious activities that have taken place in Trunk. The cross in
Trunk was dedicated on Easter Sunday in a Christian religious
ceremony227 “as a reminder of God’s promise to man of everlasting life
and of those persons who gave their lives for our freedom.”228 Mount
Soledad was selected because it was “worthy to be a setting for the
symbol of Christianity.”229 The cross stood by itself for much of the time
since its installation.230 Only in the late 1990s, in response to
controversy over the cross, were a plaque and other displays that honor
individual veterans added to signify the site as a war memorial.231 Also,
visitors have held annual Easter services at the site during much of the
cross’s history, but Veterans’ memorial services at the site began only in
the late 1990s.232

222. See Libin v. Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 399 n.4 (D. Conn. 1985) (“[T]he cross
is primarily a religious symbol. Any secondary meaning as a symbol of peace appears to be derived
from the teachings of Christ as set forth in the tenets of the Christian religions to which the cross is
sacred.”).
223. See Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1161 (10th Cir.) (describing the cross as a
“Christian symbol of death”), amended and superseded on reh’g on other grounds sub nom. Am.
Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Utah
Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
224. See Laycock, supra note 206, at 1239 (arguing that the cross’s “secondary meanings would
make no sense without the primary meaning.”).
225. See Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 1387, 1396 (2011).
226. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1838 n.9 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1437 (S.D. Cal. 1991).
228. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1103.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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Similarly, the secular purposes asserted for the Ten
Commandments,233 whether based on the text’s supposed historic value
or influence as a moral code, cannot exist without reliance on the
primary religious meaning. “To say that the Commandments are
‘historical’ is to repeat the fallacy of Lynch v. Donnelly. A miracle—
God’s appearance on a mountaintop to carve laws in stone—is
‘historical’ only if it really happened. Whether it really happened is a
matter of faith.”234
Finally, the problem with justifying land dispositions to maintain
religious symbols as commemorative objects is that “[i]t borders on the
preposterous to argue that the government can avoid an [E]stablishment
[C]lause violation by ‘dedicating’ a religious object to a nonreligious
group.”235 If this argument were true, governmental bodies could erect
unlimited permanent religious symbols—maybe even churches—on any
public property as long as they could dedicate them to secular groups.236
In sum, the use of religious symbols for a memorial is unnecessary,
and, consequently, religious symbols should be removed without carving
up public land. As history has shown, a government can easily provide a
memorial without “embedding its actions in any particular religious
narrative.”237 In fact, many memorials, such as the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial, honor the fallen service members without use of religious
symbols.238 As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, “there are countless ways
that we can and should honor [veterans], but without the imprimatur of
state-endorsed religion.”239
2. Avoiding Showing Disrespect to Religion
Another possible secular purpose governments use to justify sales
and transfers of religious objects and land under them is that removing a

233. Some theologians believe that the Ten Commandments cannot operate as a secular text
because the Commandments “teach us how to worship God, not how to build democracy.” GRIFFIN,
supra note 137, at 455 (quoting theologians Stanley M. Hauerwas and William H. Willimon).
234. Laycock, supra note 206, at 1220.
235. Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1008 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
236. Id.
237. Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729, 734 (2003).
238. See Greater Hous. Chapter of ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 234 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
239. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom.
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
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monument or symbol would risk showing disrespect toward religion.240
The argument concludes that because removing a religious object will
show hostility toward religion, the best recourse is to transfer or sell the
religious object and the land beneath it. 241
First, the government’s concern for the appearance of disrespect that
might result from an object’s removal underscores the object’s religious
significance. Disrespect would be perceived, if at all, only by those who
hold religious reverence for the object. The concern over causing
disrespect thereby undermines the government’s purported secular
interest in disposing of public land. Even if a religious object can have
dual religious and secular meanings, as Justice Breyer espoused in Van
Orden,242 the concern for causing religious disrespect brings religion to
the forefront of the government’s actions and renders any purported
secular purpose secondary to a religious one.243
Second, if the government were concerned about the appearance of
governmental disrespect for religion when it removes an object by its
own hands, it could simply sell the object—not the land—and allow
private hands to remove it. Under new ownership, the appearance of
governmental disrespect dissipates because, presumably, the public
possesses a common understanding of private ownership and that private
owners may do what they wish with the property. For example in
Mercier, removal of the Ten Commandments monument would not have
risked showing disrespect toward religion because an Episcopal church
240. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1822–23 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]his removal
would have been viewed by many as a sign of disrespect for the brave soldiers whom the cross was
meant to honor. The demolition of this venerable if unsophisticated, monument would also have
been interpreted by some as an arresting symbol of a Government that is not neutral but hostile on
matters of religion . . . .”); see also id. at 1817 (plurality opinion) (“The . . . [Government] could
not . . . remove the cross without conveying disrespect for those the cross was seen as honoring.”).
Ironically, after the Court’s decision in Buono, the cross was stolen by a veteran who
explained, in an anonymous letter, that he removed it to defend the Constitution. Anonymous Letter
Explaining Cross Theft Sent to Desert Dispatch, DESERT DISPATCH (May 11, 2010, 5:27 PM),
http://www.desertdispatch.com/news/explaining-8465-anonymous-letter.html.
The cross was
anonymously replaced within a week but then promptly removed by the National Park Service
because the installation was illegal. See Replica Cross Mysteriously Appears in Mojave,
MSNBC.COM (May 20, 2010, 9:04 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37261550.
241. See infra Part V.B. for additional discussion concerning whether the removal of religious
symbols has the effect of inhibiting or disapproving of religion as prohibited by the second prong of
the Lemon and endorsement tests.
242. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the
display’s multiple meanings).
243. It could be argued that the inverse is true, that by not allowing the government to consider
religious offense, the government is inhibiting or disapproving of religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. I address these arguments in Part V.B.
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and the Eagles, the original donor, had offered to move the monument to
another location visible to the public.244 Since the Eagles’ headquarters
was located directly across from the park,245 removing the monument to
the Eagles’ property would not have diminished the visibility of the
monument. Rather than accepting these offers that would have easily
resolved any Establishment Clause violation, the city resorted to
changing the character of public land through privatization to keep the
monument in its original location,246 leading one judge to conclude that
the city “show[ed] a stubborn refusal to separate itself from the display
of a purely religious monument.”247 The city’s rejection of all three
offers248 undermines its purported need to sell the monument and
underlying land to avoid the appearance of disrespect toward religion.
Further, the government’s justification, premised on showing respect
for religion, seems disingenuous not only because there is a readily
available alternative, but also because its own actions taken to retain
religious objects may appear disrespectful to other religions.
Governmental efforts to preserve a religious symbol on public land are
disrespectful to nonadherents as well as devout believers. One way the
government can appear disrespectful toward religion is by denying other
religious groups equal access to erect symbols of their faith on public
land.249 In Buono, the government denied a request to build a Buddhist
stupa near the cross250 but made “herculean efforts” to save the existing
cross from being removed.251 The federal government went to great
lengths to preserve the cross by passing four successive laws, some of
which within months of the district court’s decisions.252
The
government’s rejection of the stupa causes as much disrespect toward
religion as the cross’s removal might. Granted, it would be more
244. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2005).
245. Id. at 695.
246. Id. at 696.
247. Id. at 706 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 696.
249. This Article does not argue that allowing other groups to install religious symbols would
mitigate the Establishment Clause violation, but merely that rejecting other religious symbols would
open the government to greater Establishment Clause problems when it insists on selling the
religious object and land underlying it.
250. Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
251. Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Buono IV, 527
F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
252. See Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769–71 (discussing the laws passed by Congress designed to
preserve the cross).
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obvious when a religious object resting on public land is removed than
when the government silently denies a request to erect a new religious
object. But an unsuccessful donor will feel the sting of a perceived
religious rebuff when the religious object is not erected just as much as a
successful donor would when the object is removed.
Another way government preservation of religious symbols through
land dispositions can be disrespectful to religion is through secularizing
the symbol. Government secularization of religious objects may harm
religion by “diminish[ing] respect for religion”253 because the
government must disclaim or disassociate the religious significance of
the object to assert a secular purpose for the object.254 As Professor
Stanley Fish points out, “It is one of the ironies of the sequence of cases
dealing with religious symbols on public land that those who argue for
their lawful presence must first deny them the significance that provokes
the desire to put them there in the first place.”255 As Professor Steven
Goldberg observes,
People of faith who pushed to have the cross accepted as a war
memorial made the same mistake that was made when crèches,
menorahs, and Santa Claus began cavorting on courthouse lawns, and
when the Ten Commandments became a blank slate rather than a

253. See Koppelman, supra note 237, at 735 (describing the theory that religion is harmed by
government support).
254. Professor William Marshall explains:
[T]he possibility that government practices may through time become “secularized”
further compounds the issue. Many persons who would question the result in Lynch, for
example, have apparently accepted the national celebration of Christmas as permissible.
For them, apparently, Christmas is primarily a secular event while the nativity scene is
primarily religious. But who decides what is secular and what is religious? Strong
Christians are likely to view the holiday as having religious content equally as strong as,
if not stronger than, a créche. To them description of the holiday as a folk event is
certainly as demeaning of their religious principles as a similar depiction is of the créche.
Similarly, Christmas is not a secular occurrence to many non-Christians, and public
celebration of the holiday is as offensive and alienating as the display of a créche.
Perhaps a greater segment of the population might find the créche to be more religious
than the holiday; but even so, should the majority rule? In any event, how should the
threshold of “secularization” be determined? Whose perspective (and perception) should
govern?
Marshall, supra note 19, at 534–35 (footnotes omitted).
255. Stanley Fish, When is a Cross a Cross?, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (May 3, 2010, 9:00
PM), http://opinionator.blog.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/when-is-a-cross-a-cross/; see also Ian
Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono, Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1653,
1662 (2010) (discussing Fish’s article); Goldberg, supra note 217, at 278 (arguing that the
secularization of religious symbols damages their religious significance).
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biblical text. They were promoting a bleached faith in which real
religion is the loser.256

The opposition to secularizing religious symbols, and the resulting
harm, are evident in a number of cases. In Donnelly v. Lynch, because
the crèche257 is part of religious worship, an ordained minister “expressed
dismay that the City had demeaned this Christian religious symbol by
setting it in the midst of other, non-religious symbols.”258 In Glassroth v.
Moore, when a request was made to place a monument displaying a
historic speech near the Ten Commandments monument, Chief Justice
Moore insisted that no other monument share the same space because he
believed that “[t]he placement of a speech of any man alongside the
revealed law of God would tend in consequence to diminish the very
purpose of the Ten Commandments monument.”259 In Greater Houston
Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union v. Eckels, the Star of
David that was used to memorialize veterans was also offensive to
adherents.260 For one rabbi, the Star of David evoked memories of the
Holocaust and Nazi denigration of Jews.261 One reverend objected to the
Star of David and crosses as memorials because they “‘water down’ or
adulterate the very precise religions of Christianity and Judaism.”262
This discussion is not meant to suggest that government objectives
should yield to a heckler’s veto or the “tyranny of the squeamish” created
by thin-skinned individuals.263 To the contrary, religious disparagement
caused by the secularization of religious objects harms the very
community that the government intended to avoid offending.264
Moreover, the perception of religious disrespect is not the result of an
256. Goldberg, supra note 217, at 278 (footnote omitted); see also Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 812 n.19 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is always a
risk that such symbols will offend nonmembers of the faith being advertised as well as adherents
who consider the particular advertisement disrespectful.” (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 650–51 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part))).
257. A crèche is a representation of the Nativity scene.
258. 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (D.R.I. 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465
U.S. 668 (1984).
259. 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Glassroth v. Moore,
229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1297 (M.D. Ala. 2002)).
260. 589 F. Supp. 222, 226 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 227.
263. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 127 (2007).
264. Id.
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obscure or unconventional interpretation of the religious symbol’s
meaning. Rather, it results from the understanding of “competent
practitioner[s] in the relevant linguistic community” who are familiar
with the social meaning of the religious symbol.265 The government,
therefore, should be cognizant of the unintended consequences that
undermine the very objective it seeks to achieve.
Thus, if disrespect to religion is a consideration, then any perceived
disrespect resulting from removal of religious objects must be balanced
against the disrespect that would occur through the maintenance of
religious objects. And if accommodation is the appropriate policy to
further the ideals of the Establishment Clause, as the Buono plurality
suggests,266 then removing the religious object best accommodates the
concerns of religious adherents and nonbelievers. Because there is equal
risk of offending religious adherents by removing the religious symbol as
well as retaining it and greater risk of offending nonadherents by
retaining the object, if showing religious disrespect were a factor, it
should tilt in favor of removing the object. The appearance of disrespect
to religion can easily be mitigated by allowing private parties to remove
the object,267 whereas the disrespect arising from secularization of
religious objects can only be prevented by not installing religious
objects.
3. Avoiding Establishment Clause Violations
A final secular purpose governments advance to justify selling
religious objects and the public land they rest on is the avoidance of
Establishment Clause violations. Governmental compliance with the
Constitution is unquestionably a legitimate purpose, but this defense
suffers from the same problem as using a religious symbol for a
memorial or commemoration. Both defenses ignore alternative measures
of achieving the purported secular purpose.

265. Id.
266. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819–20 (2010) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the
Establishment Clause “leaves room to accommodate divergent views within a constitutionally
permissible framework”).
267. See Summum v. City of Duchesne, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1228–29 (D. Utah 2004) (noting
the removal of the monument would be a sufficient solution), rev’d, 482 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2007),
vacated sub nom. Duchesne City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 1210 (2009).
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In Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., the Court found the existence of
alternative secular measures relevant in evaluating legislative purpose.268
In Larkin, a state statute allowed schools and churches to object to the
issuance of liquor licenses269 to “protect[] spiritual, cultural, and
educational centers from the ‘hurly-burly’ associated with liquor
outlets.”270 While recognizing the validity of this secular purpose, the
Court pointed out that the government’s purpose could have been
achieved by other means, such as completely banning liquor
establishments near churches and schools or providing applicants with a
hearing when objections are made.271 As the law then existed, it
effectively allowed churches veto power over liquor licenses because it
failed to provide a standard for determining acceptable objections, and,
consequently, it violated the Establishment Clause.272

268. 459 U.S. 116, 123–24 (1982) (“[T]hese valid secular objections can readily be
accomplished by other means.”); see also Capitol Square Advisory & Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 793 (1995) (Souter, J., concurring) (reasoning that the government “was required to find
its most ‘narrowly drawn alternative’” when confronted with an Establishment Clause concern
arising out of Ku Klux Klan’s application to erect a cross in a public square (quoting Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983))); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
659 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I conclude that, in using sectarian institutions to further goals
in secular education, the three statutes do violence to the principle that ‘government may not employ
religious means to serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the
clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will not suffice.’” (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 265 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring))); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“What the Framers meant to foreclose,
and what our decisions under the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of
religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious
institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use
essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice.”);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466–67 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[I]f a statute
furthers both secular and religious ends by means unnecessary to the effectuation of the secular ends
alone—where the same secular ends could equally be attained by means which do not have
consequences for promotion of religion—the statute cannot stand.”); Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed
Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable Observer Framework in Sacred Text Cases: McCreary
County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 139, 173–74
(2006) (discussing the narrowly tailored requirement with respect to sacred texts displayed with an
apparent connection to a secular theme). But see Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 636 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting “less religious alternative”
analysis).
269. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117.
270. Id. at 123 (alteration in original) (quoting Grendel’s Den Inc., v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp.
761, 766 (D. Mass. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
271. Id. at 123–24. But see Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., 366 U.S. 617, 630
(1961) (rejecting appellant’s request to invalidate Sunday closure laws on basis that the government
has alternative means to achieve secular purpose).
272. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125–27.
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Similarly, just as the government can protect churches from the
hurly-burly of liquor establishments without giving them veto power
over liquor licenses, the government can comply with the strictures of the
Establishment Clause without divesting the public of land beneath the
religious object. The most obvious remedy for Establishment Clause
violations is simply to remove the religious objects from public land—
not to devise complex land sales or transfers to change the character of
the land from public to private. It is incumbent upon the government to
use “reasonable alternatives that are less religious in nature” to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation.273 Removing the religious object poses
no risk of conveying a religious message. On the other hand,
government sales or transfers of the land underlying the religious objects
risk perpetuating the Establishment Clause violation because of the
extreme measures the government takes to save the religious symbol.
Although use of alternative measures is not an independent test of the
Establishment Clause,274 a government’s rejection of less religious
alternatives sheds light on the sincerity of its avowed secular purpose and
is relevant to whether the sale has the effect of endorsing religion.275
When the government has two options to avoid Establishment Clause
violations, one being the removal of the religious object and the other
being to transfer or sell the land beneath it, a reasonable observer could
infer that the government intended to promote religious faith when it
decides to sell the underlying public land. 276

273. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 618 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reasoning that where the government has two symbols to convey its secular message, only one of
which has religious significance, the government’s selection of the one that has religious
significance conveys to a reasonable observer that the government intended to advance religious
faith). But see id. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting “less religious alternative” analysis);
Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 2000) (suggesting
“that this perceived endorsement of religion can be alleviated without recourse to removal of the
statue from Fund-owned property”).
274. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.7 (1984) (emphasizing that the only question
is whether a crèche violated the Establishment Clause).
275. See ACLU of Ga. v. Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d 1098, 1111 (11th Cir.
1983) (“[A] government may not ‘employ religious means to reach a secular goal unless secular
means are wholly unavailing.’” (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
294 (1963))); Jewish War Veterans of U.S. v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 3, 14 (D.D.C. 1988)
(“While federal courts for the most part have stopped short of holding the use of religious tools
where secular ones will do unconstitutional per se, it seems fair to say that the needless use of means
that are inherently religious makes a message of endorsement likely if not unavoidable.”); Greater
Hous. Chapter of ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 234 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (“[T]he use of religious
means to achieve secular goals where nonreligious means will suffice is forbidden.”); see also
Larkin, 459 U.S. at 123–25.
276. See Paulson v. Abdelnour, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“[W]here other
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Finally, if merely articulating avoidance of an Establishment Clause
violation as a secular purpose were sufficient to uphold land sales or
transfers, it would render the Establishment Clause a nullity through
circumvention.277 In Mercier, the Seventh Circuit disavowed such a
stance: “We are not endorsing a non-remedial initiative designed to sell
off patches of government land to various religious denominations as a
means of circumventing the Establishment Clause. We therefore reject
the idea that the sale was a violation of the Establishment Clause simply
because the City had other options.”278 But indeed, when a court allows
a government to sell or transfer land while other options exist, it has
provided the means for the government to circumvent the Establishment
Clause.
The government speech doctrine, as interpreted in Pleasant Grove
City, provides such a vehicle for circumvention. Hypothetically, the
government could engage in viewpoint discrimination by selectively
accepting permanent monuments and objects for its public spaces while
rejecting others.279 Then, the government could shield itself from a Free
Speech Clause violation by invoking the government speech doctrine.280
After accepting the religious object, the government could keep the
monument on public land until objections against the display reach the
courts. Once a legal challenge is filed, the government could retain the
object in the very spot by merely transferring the property. There is
nothing to keep the government from repeating these actions for each
religious object it wants permanently erected on public land.
Summum v. Duchesne City is one example of a government using a
land sale to circumvent the Establishment Clause.281 In this case, the city
accepted a donation of a stone monolith depicting the Ten

nonsectarian options are available, government has lent its prestige and power through a sectarian
choice.”).
277. See Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 304 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[A]lthough this court
‘will defer to a municipality’s sincere articulation of a religious symbol’s secular purpose,’ we shall
not accept a stated purpose that merely seeks to avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation.”
(quoting Gonzales v. N. Twp., 4 F.3d 1412, 1419 (7th Cir. 1993))).
278. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005).
279. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2010) (finding the city’s decision
to accept privately donated monuments is government speech and therefore not subject to the Free
Speech Clause).
280. See id.
281. 340 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (D. Utah 2004), rev’d, 482 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2007), vacated, 555
U.S. 1210 (2009).
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Commandments for its public park.282 Threatened by litigation, the city
transferred the monument and the land underlying it to the Duchesne
City Lion’s Club.283 The only consideration for the land and monument
was “the Lion’s Club’s previous, current and future services to the
community.”284 Three weeks later, Summum requested a similar plot of
land next to the Ten Commandments monolith on which to place a
monument of the Seven Aphorisms.285 The city denied Summum’s
request, unequivocally informing Summum that it would not be allowed
to erect its own monument until it donated equivalent time and service to
the community as the Lion’s Club and the family that donated the
monolith.286 Subsequently, Summum filed a lawsuit alleging violations
of its Free Speech rights.287 During the litigation, the city nullified the
land transfer to the Lion’s Club and passed ordinances authorizing the
city to sell a parcel of land in the park on which the monument rested to
the family who originally donated the monument and to permanently
close the park to future private displays.288 The city sold the land for fair
market value, and, after the sale, the private owner erected a fence and a
sign.289 The district court upheld the sale as an “adequate” method for
the city to disassociate itself from the monument.290
As Duchesne City illustrates, allowing the government to sell the
land beneath a religious object permits the government to make an endrun around constitutional mandates. The city exercised preferential
treatment by allowing the Ten Commandments monument but rejecting
the Seven Aphorisms monument. The city then ensured the continued
display of the preferred religious monument through the land sale and
ensured, by closing the public park entirely to private displays, that no
other group be afforded equal access.
Like in Duchesne City, the potential for the government to
circumvent the Establishment Clause was present in Buono. There, an
individual had requested permission to erect a Buddhist stupa beside an

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. 1223–24.
Id. at 1224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id. at 1230.
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existing cross.291 Because the government denied the request on grounds
of violating National Park Service regulations, the stupa was never
installed.292 If the government now, after transferring land to the cross’s
donor, is permitted to deny a subsequent request for land transfer by the
individual interested in erecting a stupa, the government effectively
would be permitted to disregard the strictures of the Establishment
Clause.
The government might respond that subsequent land transfers are
unnecessary because there are no other religious objects on the contested
public property. But this response is unsatisfactory considering that the
government prevented other religious objects from being installed, which
consequently provides the justification to deny other requests for land.
In Buono, had the government permitted the stupa, basic principles of
equality would require a transfer of the land underlying the stupa. In this
regard, the government can circumvent the Establishment Clause by
endorsing religion through the first land transfer and expressing a
preference for one religious sect by denying subsequent land transfers to
other religious groups, like in Duchesne City.
One might defend the governmental actions in Duchesne City or
Buono on the basis that the government may preserve existing religious
symbols as memorials while rejecting additional symbolic memorials.293
Although a first-installed-first-preserved rule could appear reasonable,
such a rule would in effect advance religious preferences. The most
historically entrenched permanent symbols have been pervasively
Christian.294 “The displays almost always represent objects of dominant,
or at least less marginalized, religious groups, and thus the failure to find
such displays unconstitutional in many circumstances amounts to a de
facto establishment of majority religious preferences.”295 Thus, allowing
a first-installed-first-preserved rule would perpetuate the preference
shown for the majoritarian religion.

291. Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
292. See id.
293. See Clement, supra note 147, at 254 (pointing out that there are “many secular reasons
Congress may have had in seeking to preserve the decades-old private war memorial, while at the
same time not objecting to the Park Service’s determination that new memorials on the same site
were inappropriate.”).
294. See, e.g., supra notes 71, 123. One rare case involved a Buddhist bell. Brooks v. City of
Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2000).
295. Frank S. Ravitch, Religious Objects as Legal Subjects, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1011,
1061 (2005).
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V. EFFECT OF LAND DISPOSITION
Even if the government has a secular purpose behind land
dispositions, such actions may be invalid if they cause an impermissible
effect: conveying a message of governmental endorsement or
disapproval of religion. An evaluation of the history and ubiquity of the
practice, context and physical setting of the display, and procedural
irregularity296 involved in land disposition cases leads a reasonable
observer to conclude that the government is promoting religion. These
considerations militate in favor of removing the religious object, which
the government can do without being perceived as inhibiting or
disapproving of religion.
A. Endorsing Religion
1. History and Ubiquity
History and ubiquity are among the factors the Court has considered
when evaluating the effect of government actions in Establishment
Clause cases.297 The history and ubiquity of the practice provides the
reasonable observer context to assess whether the action conveys a
message that the government is approving or disapproving of religion.298
The question, as Justice O’Connor framed it, is whether a reasonable
observer would view longstanding practices as endorsing religion if they
were undertaken for a secular purpose and their religious relevance has
dissipated with time.299
Courts have noted the longevity of a religious symbol to emphasize
its historical significance in establishing that the object has become an
accepted part of the community.300 In Van Orden, for example, to bolster

296. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692–94 (1984).
297. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 778 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (inquiring into the “history and administration” of a
government practice to determine endorsement).
298. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630; see also Pinette, 515 U.S. at 778 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
299. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631.
300. See, e.g., Trunk v. City of San Diego, 660 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011) (Bea, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that other courts have found that “whether the
government has violated the Establishment Clause by erecting or maintaining a religious symbol on
public grounds depends on: (1) the government’s use of the religious symbol; (2) the context in
which that symbol appears; and (3) the history of the symbol while under government control,
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its position that the display was constitutional, the plurality noted that the
Ten Commandments monument had existed for forty years without
controversy.301 Justice Breyer espoused this rationale in Van Orden
when he explained that “[i]t was particularly important that the Texas
display stood uncontested for forty years. That fact indicated, as a
practical matter of degree, that (unlike the Kentucky display [in
McCreary]) the Texas display was unlikely to prove socially divisive.”302
This line of argument has carried over to land dispositions, where it
contends that land disposition does not convey a message of government
endorsement because the religious symbol’s longevity demonstrates that
its religious message has dissipated. In Buono, the nearly seven decades
that the cross had stood persuaded the plurality of its historical meaning:
“Time has also played its role. The cross has stood on Sunrise Rock for
nearly seven decades before the statute was enacted. By then, the cross
and the cause it commemorated had become entwined in the public
consciousness.”303

including how long it has stood unchallenged”), cert. denied sub nom. Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n
v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
301. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005) (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer
stated, “I am not aware of any evidence suggesting that [the absence of prior litigation] was due to a
climate of intimidation.” Id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring). The Seventh Circuit in Mercier made a
similar conclusion. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2005).
302. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 123
(2005).
303. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817 (2010) (plurality opinion). Although the plurality
in Buono invoked the history of the cross as a justification for its preservation, it failed to reconcile
its supposed historical significance with the fact that the cross did not qualify as a National Historic
Landmark. See Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008). The cross had been replaced
throughout the years, and the plaque no longer accompanied it. Id.
Also, interestingly, the government sought to cloak the cross with the prestige and protection
bestowed to a National Historic Landmark although it had previously determined granting such
designations to religious properties would offend the Establishment Clause. In 1995, the
Department of Justice advised the Department of the Interior about the constitutionality of providing
historic preservation grants to religious properties. The DOJ concluded that “direct award of historic
preservation grants to churches and other pervasively sectarian institutions violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.” Constitutionality of Awarding Historic Preservation
Grants to Religious Properties to Solicitor of Dep’t of the Interior, Memorandum Op. O.L.C. (Oct.
31, 1995), http://www.justice.gov/olc/doi.24.htm (emphasis omitted). In 2003, the DOJ reversed its
policy. Authority of the Dep’t of the Interior to Provide Historic Preservation Grants to Historic
Religious Properties Such as the Old North Church to Solicitor of Dep’t of Interior, Memorandum
Op. O.L.C. (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/OldNorthChurch.htm; see also Christen
Sproule, Federal Funding for the Preservation of Religious Historic Places: Old North Church and
the New Establishment Clause, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 171–73 (2005) (discussing the shift in
DOJ policy).
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This line of argument is problematic because it “smacks of
bootstrapping.”304 It is equivalent to arguing “the longer the violation,
the less violative it becomes. The longer a [religious object] is
displayed . . . , the more the effect is to memorialize rather than
sermonize.”305 Although in Marsh v. Chambers, the Court permitted
legislative prayers because of their “unique history,”306 the Court has
narrowly applied Marsh by emphasizing that “Marsh plainly does not
stand for the sweeping proposition . . . that all accepted practices 200
years old and their equivalents are constitutional today.”307 Such a
reading of Marsh, as the Court explained, “would gut the core of the
Establishment Clause.”308
The interpretation that an unchallenged practice signifies community
support, however, fails to consider the possibility that longevity of the
practice or silence of religious minorities represents “something quite
different from disinterest.”309 Professor Douglas Laycock explains,
It is far more plausible to infer that those who knew and might have
complained saw little hope of success in filing a lawsuit . . . .
[Additionally,] it is far more plausible to infer that anyone who knew
about the display, objected to it, and thought he could win a lawsuit
might have been intimidated, or at least might have thought it was just
not worth the cost in hassle and social disapproval to pursue a lawsuit
that would produce intense political resistance and no monetary
recovery.310

As Justice Souter pointed out in Van Orden,
Suing a State over religion puts nothing in a plaintiff’s pocket and can
take a great deal out, and even with volunteer litigators to supply time
and energy, the risk of social ostracism can be powerfully deterrent. I

304. Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 495 (7th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Gonzales v. N. Twp., 4 F.3d 1412, 1422 (7th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
305. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1422); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S.
at 746–47 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the passage of time should not impact the
constitutionality of the issue).
306. 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983).
307. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989); see
also EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 263, at 138 (arguing that in some contexts, “tradition and
historical pedigree will not save sectarian symbols”).
308. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 604.
309. Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1433 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (quoting Hewitt v. Joyner,
940 F.2d 1561, 1567 (9th Cir. 1991)).
310. Laycock, supra note 206, at 1224.
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doubt that a slow walk to the courthouse, even one that took 40 years,
is much evidentiary help in applying the Establishment Clause.311

Trunk demonstrates that lack of litigation does not equate to the
religious object’s acceptance. In Trunk, the Ninth Circuit explained that
there was a history of anti-Semitism, particularly in the housing market
in La Jolla, where the cross had been erected.312 Challenges concerning
the constitutionality of the cross began to surface within a decade of Jews
and other minorities gaining access to the housing market in La Jolla.313
These events suggest that the discrimination in La Jolla “may have
stifled complaints about the Memorial early in its lifetime.”314
A reasonable observer who possesses historical knowledge could
perceive the government’s efforts in Trunk and Buono as endorsing or
advancing religion. As the Court stated, “[R]easonable observers have
reasonable memories, and our precedents sensibly forbid an observer ‘to
turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose.’”315 The
reasonable observer would know that the site in Trunk was not originally
a war memorial and did not acquire physical elements to indicate it was a
memorial until late 1989.316 Such an observer would be aware that the
association chose the site because it believed it to be “a fitting place on
which to erect an emblem of faith,” and accordingly erected the cross as
a tribute to God.317 Even when the cross was dedicated as a war
memorial in 1954, it was simultaneously dedicated to Jesus Christ.318
After the dedication, the site became the setting for Easter services and
other religious ceremonies.319 Most of the secular events taking place at
the site occurred only after legal challenges were initiated in 1996.320
Additionally, “[g]iven that the Cross was constructed in La Jolla with a
distinctively religious purpose, by La Jolla residents, during the height of
this discriminatory period, we cannot ignore that such discrimination is

311. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 747 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
312. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom.
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
313. Id. at 1122.
314. Id.
315. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000)).
316. See Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1118–19.
317. Id. at 1119.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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part of the Memorial’s history and context and informs the reasonable
observer’s views.”321 The reasonable observer would also know that the
site in Buono had hosted Easter services since 1935 and that no annual
Armistice Day or Veterans Day services were held until controversy over
the cross arose.322
Thus, the longevity of a religious symbol is an unreliable indicator of
historical significance and should not mitigate the object’s religious
significance.323 On the contrary, the longer a religious object has been in
place the more it solidifies the object’s religious message and its
sectarian prominence or dominance. Arguments relying on a religious
object’s longevity fail to recognize that time may in fact undermine
support for the object’s continued display.
2. Context and Physical Setting
The context and physical setting of a religious object is yet another
factor relevant to considering the effect of land sales and transfers.
Context was significant in Lynch, where Justice O’Connor found no
effect of government endorsement.324 In Lynch, Justice O’Connor first
applied the endorsement test to review the constitutionality of a city’s
inclusion of a crèche in a display among a Santa Claus, Christmas tree,
clown, elephant, and teddy bear.325 Justice O’Connor believed that the
government’s purpose for including the crèche among the display was to
celebrate the winter holiday, not promote religion.326
Although
displaying the crèche among secular objects did not neutralize the
religious symbolism of the crèche, such a varied display negated any
message of government endorsement of religion.327 Similarly, in
Allegheny, Justice O’Connor concluded that a menorah did not convey
an endorsement of religion because it was displayed next to a Christmas
tree and a message saluting liberty.328

321. Id. at 1121 n.20.
322. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1838 n.9 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Buono II, 371 F.3d 543, 548–49 (9th Cir. 2004).
323. See Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1526 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring more than
“mere longevity” in evaluating the historical significance of the site of a Latin cross erected and
maintained in a public park).
324. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692–93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
325. Id. at 671, 691.
326. Id. at 691.
327. Id. at 692.
328. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 635 (1989)
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In Capitol Square Advisory & Review Board v. Pinette, Justice
O’Connor applied the reasonable person construct to determine if a cross
erected by the Ku Klux Klan in a public square accompanied by a sign
disclaiming government sponsorship would convey a message of
endorsement.329 Justice O’Connor attributed to the reasonable person the
knowledge that the cross is a religious symbol and that the square is a
public park located near the seat of government.330 Her reasonable
person also knew that the public square had been used in the past by
private speakers331 and understood the difference between speech
supported by the government and speech permitted by the government as
a result of opening the space to private speakers.332 Justice O’Connor
concluded that the reasonable person would not interpret the Klan’s cross
as a religious endorsement because the reasonable observer would also
read and understand the Klan’s disclaimer.333
In contrast,
notwithstanding the disclaimer in Allegheny, displaying the crèche in
“the main and most beautiful part of the building that is the seat of
county government” sent an “unmistakable message that [the
government] supports and promotes the Christian praise to God that is
the crèche’s religious message.”334
Similar to the crèche in Allegheny, the physical setting of the
displays in Trunk and Buono are likely to convey to a reasonable
observer a message of government endorsement. Although the displays
rest on private land since the divestiture, the continued display of the
religious objects in prominent places may perpetuate the aura of
government endorsement. The Seventh Circuit implicitly recognized, by
pointing out that the monument was not located in a “particularly
privileged location in the aesthetic scheme of the Park,” that the location
of a monument would affect the Establishment Clause analysis.335 The
Ten Commandments monument in Mercier was illuminated by a spot
light affixed to a rooftop;336 the crosses in Trunk and Buono were erected

(O’Connor, J., concurring).
329. 515 U.S. 753, 778–82 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
330. Id. at 780–81.
331. Id. at 781.
332. Id. at 782.
333. Id.
334. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 599–600 (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
335. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2005).
336. Id. at 696.
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in a place of prominence on a mountain and rock outcropping,
respectively, highlighting the religious message of the Latin crosses.337
In Trunk, the cross’s sheer size—weighing twenty-four tons and standing
forty-three feet tall atop a mountain—dominated its surroundings338 and
towered over thousands of drivers.339
The religious message of the cross in Trunk, unlike the crèche in
Lynch, is not negated by surrounding secular objects.340 While the cross
is visible for miles from different perspectives, the secular message
conveyed by the inscriptions on the plaques is not visible except to an
observer standing near them.341 “In fact, the Cross is the only element of
the Memorial that can be seen from anywhere except the site of the
Memorial itself—including from Interstate 15, which is much farther
from Mount Soledad than Interstate 5.”342
In Buono, there were no other displays to neutralize the religious
significance of the cross. Formerly, there had been at one time a sign
stating that the cross was intended to commemorate war veterans.343
Although Congress appropriated funds for the installment of a replica
plaque at the cross,344 the plaque was unlikely to neutralize the effect of
the cross. Because the cross in Buono, too, stood in an elevated position
on top of Sunrise Rock, visible from a distance,345 an observer would not
be able to read from afar the secular message of a plaque.
Even if equally prominent secular objects were added, their inclusion
would not cure the Establishment Clause problem. In McCreary, the
county attempted to avoid Establishment Clause violations by
surrounding the Ten Commandments poster with secular, historical

337. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom.
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803,
1811 (2010) (plurality opinion).
338. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1123.
339. Id. at 1103.
340. See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying the Endorsement of Symbolic
Religious Speech, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 222 (2004) (arguing that the religious significance of
“intrinsically sectarian symbols, such as a cross or Star of David” cannot be muted by including
other secular objects).
341. See Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1123.
342. Id.
343. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010) (plurality opinion).
344. Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 770 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Department of Defense and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on
the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(c), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002)), rev’d
and remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
345. Id. at 769.
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documents.346 The Court, however, was not persuaded, believing the
county’s attempts to be a ruse to mask the county’s religious message.347
Similarly in Trunk, neither the secular objects, like the bollards, plaques,
and pavers later added to the site,348 nor the belated secular events, like
the Veterans’ Day ceremonies,349 could diffuse the religious meaning of
the cross or the religious activities that have occurred at the site since the
cross’s installation.350 In Lynch and Allegheny, the Court did not hold
that the inclusion of other objects muted the religious messages of the
crèche and menorah.351 “The idea that sacred objects can be robbed of
their sacred meaning by placement in a broader display is not in keeping
with the general understanding of the nature of religious objects and
symbols.”352
Finally, erecting fences and signs disclaiming government ownership
after the land has been conveyed to private owners is an inadequate
solution “when the problem is not limited to potential confusion
regarding the source of the speech.”353 In Allegheny, the Court
considered the constitutionality of the crèche and menorah in the context
of their surroundings and the effect the posted signs had on government
endorsement.354
The Court held that the crèche display was
unconstitutional despite the fact that the city posted a sign next to the
crèche explaining a Roman Catholic organization’s ownership of the
display.355 Rather than finding that the sign mitigated an appearance of
government endorsement, the Court concluded that the sign signified the
government’s endorsement of the organization’s religious message.356
On the other hand, the city’s sign saluting liberty positioned next to the
menorah and Christmas tree conveyed cultural diversity rather than a
religious endorsement.357
346. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 856–57 (2005).
347. See id. at 873, 881.
348. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom.
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
349. Id. at 1119.
350. Id. at 1118, 1121.
351. Ravitch, supra note 295, at 1059; EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 263, at 134.
352. Ravitch, supra note 295, at 1059–60.
353. Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1012 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
354. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
355. Id. at 600. The crèche display included a sign stating “This Display Donated by the Holy
Name Society.” Id. at 580.
356. Id. at 600.
357. Id. at 619. The sign next to the forty-five foot Christmas tree that was placed outside next
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In circumstances where the land being transferred to private
ownership is surrounded by vast public land, it is unlikely that the
reasonable observer understands the significance of signs and fencing
around the property. For example, as the district court pointed out in
Buono III, because the cross is visible by visitors traveling in cars as far
as 100 yards away, drivers are unlikely to “quickly recognize”358 that the
one acre “donut hole of land”359 that the cross sits on is private property
when it is surrounded by 1.6 million acres of public land.360 In the more
extreme case of Trunk, there is even a greater likelihood that the
reasonable observer will perceive the massive cross as government
endorsement. No sign can disclaim government ownership in this
instance because the federal government actually owns the seized cross
and its surrounding property.361 Thus, adding secular objects like signs,
fencing, and other monuments is an inadequate measure to disclaim
government efforts to preserve a religious symbol that is surrounded by
public land, particularly when the reasonable observer has historical
knowledge of government involvement.
3. Deviation in Procedures and Illegality
Whether there are any deviations from government procedures or
regulations for divesting public land via a sale or transfer should also
affect the reasonable observer’s perception of the transaction’s effect.
Several cases involve regulatory deviations and congressional anomalies.
In Chambers v. City of Frederick, the city did not follow procedures for
selling public land and accepted a lower bid.362 In Mercier,363 Buono,364

to the eighteen foot menorah stated: “During this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes
liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty and our
legacy of freedom.” Id. at 582.
358. Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Buono IV, 527
F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
359. Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
360. Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 n.7.
361. See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom.
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
362. 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2005) (failing to question the city’s noncompliance with
requirements for selling public land).
363. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2005).
364. Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
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and City of Marshfield,365 the land dispositions occurred without the
solicitation of other bids.
A reasonable observer would interpret the divestiture of public land
to a predetermined recipient without seeking other bids or in lieu of a
higher bidder as an endorsement of religion. Rather than endorsing
religion directly by displaying the religious monument on public land,
the government endorses religion by giving a private group preferential
access to display its religious message on property that is surrounded by
public land.366 In essence, the government sells a platform to a religious
group that it knows will continue the religious message of the object.367
As the Pinette plurality stated: “Of course, giving sectarian religious
speech preferential access to a forum close to the seat of government (or
anywhere else for that matter) would violate the Establishment
Clause.”368 A reasonable observer would see no meaningful distinction
between a government’s display of a religious object and its
authorization of one private owner’s permanent religious display resting
in the same location, surrounded by government land.369
In addition to failing to seek other bids, the land exchange in Buono
occurred outside of established National Park Service procedure.370 The
Buono plurality embraced the cross’s history371 but ignored that the
original cross and subsequent replacements have existed illegally
because they were installed without authorization.372 The National Park
Service acknowledged this in a letter responding to a request to erect a
stupa and through its removal of a replacement cross.373 A few days after
the Court announced its decision in Buono, the cross at the center of the

365. Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2000).
366. Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2005).
367. See id. at 1012.
368. 515 U.S. 753, 766 (1995) (plurality opinion).
369. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
370. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Permanent Injunction, Buono III, 364 F.
Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758 (2008), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
371. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817 (2010) (plurality opinion) (revisiting the
cross’s history and interpreting the congressional memorial designation as giving recognition to the
historical meaning the cross had attained); see also id. at 1822–23 (Alito, J., concurring).
372. Contra Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting originals and replacements
have existed illegally, a notion the Supreme Court did not consider), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
373. Id.
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litigation was anonymously removed and later replaced.374 The National
Park Service removed the replacement cross because it, too, was installed
illegally.375
Also, congressional irregularities affect a reasonable observer’s
perceptions. In Buono, although Congress passed four successive acts
relating to the cross and received the benefit of the plurality’s legislative
deference,376 the legislative history is devoid of the customary debate
attendant to legislative acts. There is no legislative history to show
congressional deliberation, particularly regarding the national cross
designation377 or land transfer.378 Given that in each of the successive
acts pertaining to the cross the relevant provision dealing with the cross
was “buried in a defense appropriations bill,”379 it is easy to see how
those provisions could be enacted without much notice.
A reasonable observer who is aware of the government’s
noncompliance with its own laws or customary procedures would likely
perceive such maneuvers as government endorsement of religion.
Moreover, deviations in procedure to effectuate land dispositions can
convey a sectarian preference. A reasonable observer would see such

374. Park Service Removes Mojave Cross Replica, CBN.COM (May 21, 2010),
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2010/May/Stolen-Mojave-Desert-Cross-Returned/; Replica Cross
Mysteriously Appears in Mojave: Authorities Call it Illegal and Remove it from Federal Preserve,
MSNBC.COM (May 20, 2010, 9:04 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37261550.
375. CBN.COM, supra note 374; MSNBC.COM, supra note 374.
376. See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813, 1817 (plurality opinion) (reviewing the four statutes related
to the cross).
377. Id. at 1834 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
378. Id. at 1840 (noting that there are “no factual findings, reasoning, or long history of careful
legislative adjustments [and] Congress did not devote years of careful study to § 8121, nor did it
develop a record of any kind, much less an exhaustive one” (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
379. See id. (citing Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom.
Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758 (2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803
(2010)). The prohibition against expending federal funds to remove the cross consisted merely of
three lines within an act spanning 712 pages. See Consolidated Appropriations Act—FY 2001, Pub.
L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A–230 (2000). The cross’s designation appeared in a
few lines in a 126-page act. See Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002). The second prohibition against
expenditure of federal funds for the cross’s removal appeared in two lines of an act consisting of
fifty-eight pages. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248, §
8065(b), 116 Stat. 1514, 1551 (2002). The provision transferring the land consisted of one
paragraph within fifty-six pages of an act. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(a), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003).
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herculean efforts380 to save a majoritarian religious symbol as additional
government support of majority religions over minority religions.381
If anything, the sale . . . exacerbates the violation because it
communicates to nonadherents that not only is the City willing to
display a Judeo-Christian symbol on public property, but it is also
willing to carve up a public park to [e]nsure that the symbol does not
have to be moved or share its space with displays expressing other
viewpoints.382

The disposition “sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.”383 Thus, after considering the
longevity, context, and procedural irregularities of the religious object, a
reasonable observer would view the government’s privatization of public
land as endorsement of religion, and such perceptions can be avoided by
removing the religious symbols.
B. Inhibiting or Disapproving of Religion
While the government must be careful not to endorse religion, it
must also take equal care not to inhibit or show disapproval of
religion.384 Some may criticize requiring the government to remove
religious symbols on public land as being unnecessarily secular or even
violating the Lemon and endorsement tests by inhibiting or disapproving
of religion. It has been argued that when the government acts in a
secular manner without regard for the role of religion in society, it
actually prefers nonreligion over religion,385 harbors a “latent hostility”386

380. Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
381. See Budd, supra note 340, at 224. As Budd put it:
Accommodations in the remedial context thus should be permitted only if they afford
endorsed religious speech no expressive advantage vis a vis competing private
viewpoints. To otherwise permit government to project its perceived favoritism into the
sphere of private expression will perpetuate rather than dissipate apparent endorsement in
the view of a skeptical observer.
Id. (footnote omitted).
382. Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1013 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
383. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
384. See id. at 690; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
385. In Lynch, the mayor stated, “The people absolutely resent somebody trying to impose
another kind of religion on them . . . . I think the denigration, trying to eliminate these kind [sic] of
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or “callous indifference toward religious faith,”387 favors “nontheistic
religion/faith,”388 or promotes “a religion of secularism.”389
But these types of arguments misunderstand the Establishment
Clause. A “religion of secularism,” as defined by the Court, entails
“affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring
those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.’”390 When
the government declines association with religious monuments, it is not
preferring those who believe in no religion. Rather, it is merely being
silent on the matter of religion. “A secular state, it must be remembered,
is not the same as an atheistic or antireligious state. A secular state
establishes neither atheism nor religion as its official creed.”391
Affirmative beliefs like Humanism and atheism require positive
assertions and are not advanced merely by government restraint in the
realm of religion.392 Preferring nonreligion requires an affirmative act,
such as allowing a display that states that there is no God or Supreme
Being. To interpret government silence and inaction as a type of
preference for nonreligion would turn the Establishment Clause on its
head. Put another way, “[i]f ‘non-religion’ is, in fact, religion, then
every governmental action is an establishment.”393 This interpretation

things, is a step towards establishing another religion, non-religion that it may be.” Donnelly v.
Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.R.I. 1981) (first alteration in original), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st
Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
386. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
387. Id. at 664.
388. McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument that
removing religious monument favors nontheistic faith). Similarly, Professors Christopher Eisgruber
and Lawrence Sager point out that
[t]here is an opprobrious dimension to the Court’s judgment. But that is just a function of
constitutional adjudication generally: there will often be a moral dimension to
constitutional disputes, and persons on the losing side may understand themselves to have
been criticized by an official organ of the state. The social meaning of the [C]ourt’s
decision does not on this account include the message that anyone is less than a full
member of any relevant community.
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 263, at 129–30.
389. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (rejecting
argument that prohibiting Bible readings at school would promote “a religion of secularism”).
390. Id. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
391. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610.
392. Greater Hous. Chapter of ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 228–31 (S.D. Tex. 1984)
(pointing to expert witness testimony stating Humanism rejects beliefs in God, cherishes the powers
of man, and is promoted through the symbol known as the Happy Humanist).
393. Marshall, supra note 19, at 542.
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would make it impossible to correct Establishment Clause violations
“because every time a violation is found and cured by the removal of the
statue or practice that cure itself would violate the Establishment Clause
by leaving behind empty space.”394
Moreover, arguments that the government is hostile to religion when
it removes a religious symbol or takes a position on secular subjects
antithetical to religious tenets have not been successful in the courts.395
Los Angeles County, for instance, removed the cross from its official
seal in an effort to maintain neutrality in compliance with the
Establishment Clause396 and as a result, faced litigation alleging that the
county’s actions were “motivated by [its] disapproval of, and hostility
toward, the Christian religion.”397 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
because the county sought to avoid violating the Establishment Clause,
the county had a secular purpose.398 In light of the fact that the county
acted in response to court cases invalidating other municipalities’ seals
with crosses on them, the court found that a reasonable observer aware of
history of the government’s actions would not interpret removing the
cross as government disapproval of Christianity or religion.399
In Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City & County
of San Francisco400 and American Family Ass’n v. City & County of San
Francisco,401 the Ninth Circuit considered other cases, although not
involving religious symbols, that invoked Lemon’s prohibition against
the disapproval of religion. In American Family Ass’n, the government
responded to religious organizations’ advertising campaigns against
homosexuality by passing resolutions denouncing those ads and their
sponsors.402 In Catholic League, the city adopted a resolution “urging
Cardinal William Levada . . . to withdraw his discriminatory and
defamatory directive that Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San

394. McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004).
395. See GRIFFIN, supra note 137, at 78–79 (discussing the courts’ approach to cases involving
Lemon’s disapproval prong); see also Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. San
Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, 629 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010); Vasquez v.
Los Angeles Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007); Am. Family Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
396. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1248.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 1255–56.
399. Id. at 1257.
400. 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, 629 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010).
401. 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
402. Id. at 1118–20.
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Francisco stop placing children in need of adoption with homosexual
households.”403 The plaintiffs in both cases argued that the government’s
defense of homosexuals was hostile to religious beliefs that
homosexuality is deviant and immoral,404 but the Ninth Circuit upheld
the city’s actions because it recognized that promotion of gay rights and
same-sex adoption as well as prevention of hate crimes against
homosexuals can have a “secular dimension.”405 The court concluded
that a reasonable observer would not interpret the resolutions, when
viewed in the context of the city’s other actions defending the rights of
homosexuals, as primarily disapproving of or inhibiting religion.406 As
the court explained, a “belief can have both religious and secular
dimensions; the government is not stripped of its secular purpose simply
because the same concept can be construed as religious. . . . [I]f
consistency with religious beliefs is not endorsement of religion,
inconsistency is not hostility to it.”407
Therefore, actions taken on secular issues, such as removing
religious symbols from public land, that may conflict with religious
beliefs nonetheless comport with the Establishment Clause and do not
establish a “religion of secularism” or hostility toward religion.
VI. EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ENTANGLEMENT
Government entanglement, whether evaluated as an individual test in
Lemon408 or collapsed into the endorsement test’s effect prong,409 is
another relevant consideration for determining the constitutionality of
land sales and transfers involving religious objects. To determine
whether a government act implicates excessive government
entanglement, the Court has “examine[d] the character and purposes of
the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State

403. Catholic League, 567 F.3d at 598.
404. Id. at 602; Am. Family Ass’n, 277 F.3d at 1122.
405. Catholic League, 567 F.3d at 602; see also Am. Family Ass’n, 277 F.3d at 1121–22
(holding that the city had a secular purpose for discouraging violence against gays and that the
resolution had a secular effect, not a primary effect of inhibiting or disapproving of religion).
406. Catholic League, 567 F.3d at 606; Am. Family Ass’n, 277 F.3d at 1122.
407. Catholic League, 567 F.3d at 603.
408. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
409. Even when government entanglement was “first explicitly articulated in Walz v. Tax
Commission . . . [it] could easily have been construed as simply a pragmatic rephrasing of the
‘primary effect’ test.” Kenneth F. Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses—A Ten
Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1197 (1980).
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provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority.”410 Although some argue that the entanglement
prong should be disregarded,411 the Court has invalidated laws that
administratively entangle the government by requiring a
“comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance”412
and has expressed concerns about laws that engender political
divisiveness.413 The government’s inclusion of restrictive covenants and
retention of reversionary interests in land dispositions potentially
entangles the government with religion by continuing government
involvement in monitoring and enforcing these provisions, and by
engendering political divisiveness.
A. Restrictive Covenants
Few would disagree that a government’s explicit mandate to retain a
religious object on land it conveys to a private owner would excessively
entangle the government in religion. The more contentious issue is
whether a restrictive covenant that requires maintenance of a memorial
effectively mandates a private owner to retain the religious object itself.
Resolving this issue depends on statutory construction and common
sense.
Considering the facts in Buono, a reasonable observer could view the
land transfer and legislative acts as a means to preserve the cross. The
land transfer act requires that the new owner maintain the property as a
410. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
411. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429–30 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (expressing
“reservations” about the entanglement prong), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997);
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768–69 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (describing the
entanglement prong as “unnecessary,” “insolubly paradoxical,” and “curious and mystifying”);
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 661–71 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the entanglement element as “curious
and mystifying”); see also Kristi L. Bowman, An Empirical Study of Evolution, Creationism, and
Intelligent Design Instruction in Public Schools, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 301, 313 (2007) (“[T]he third
prong (entanglement) is practically forgotten, although it has not been officially, uniformly
disregarded.”); Rupal M. Doshi, Note, Nonincorporation of the Establishment Clause: Satisfying the
Demands of Equality, Pluralism, and Originalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 459, 479 (2010). But see Friedman
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 780 n.3 (10th Cir. 1985) (“In addition, we must caution that
courts not be too easily convinced that the administrative or political entanglement demonstrated in a
given case is de minimis because of the limited monetary value of the government’s
involvement. . . . Expense is not the only path to entanglement. And, even if it were, we must
remember that it is no defense to say that the government’s action represents a ‘relatively minor
encroachment on the First Amendment.’” (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 225 (1963))).
412. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
413. Id. at 622–24.
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war memorial.414 Although the government argued in Buono that the act
is ambiguous as to whether the cross must be part of the required
memorial,415 it is logical to read the transfer act as requiring maintenance
of the cross because Congress had specifically designated the cross as a
memorial416 and required funds to install a replica of the plaque.417 First,
Congress authorized up to $10,000 for a replica of the cross and plaque.
It would make little sense that the land transfer act’s requirement to
preserve the memorial meant anything other than the cross’s preservation
after such expenditure of tax dollars and effort to acquire the replica.
Second, there is no ambiguity that Congress intended “memorial” to
mean the cross when, on the heels of the district court’s injunction, it
passed the act forbidding the use of federal funds to “dismantle national
memorials commemorating United States participation in World War
I.”418 It is strange to suggest that the word memorial—the meaning of
which was clear in the two prior acts—should suddenly become
ambiguous in the land transfer act; there has been no subsequent act to
supersede the designation of the cross as a national memorial.419 Further,
statutory construction requires that the land transfer act’s reference to a
war memorial mean the cross: “[An] accepted rule of construction is that
ambiguities in a newly enacted statute are to be resolved in such a
fashion as to make the statute, not only internally consistent, but also
compatible with previously enacted laws.”420 Finally, it often takes a
congressional act to abolish a national memorial.421 Because no
subsequent act has changed the cross’s designation as a memorial, the
cross must still be the memorial referred to in the land transfer act.
414. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(e), 117 Stat.
1054, 1100 (2003).
415. See Brief for the Petitioners at 33, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472),
2009 WL 1526915, at *33 (arguing that the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004
“does nothing ‘to preserve and maintain the cross’”).
416. The memorial was previously officially designated as the “White Cross World War I
Memorial.” Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 770 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
417. See Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery
from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002 Pub. L. No. 107-117, §
8137(c), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002).
418. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 771 (quoting Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub.
L. No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1514, 1551 (2002)).
419. See Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between Endorsement and History, 105
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 51 n.59 (2010) (“[A]bolishing National Memorial status frequently
has entailed specific congressional action.”).
420. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 16 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997).
421. Dolan, supra note 419, at 51 n.59.
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The argument that a restrictive covenant requiring a memorial’s
maintenance does not include the religious object itself is disingenuous.
In most instances, the religious object and land underlying it are sold,
without seeking other bidders or accepting higher bids, to the object’s
original donor or to someone else who expressed an interest in
maintaining the religious object. In Mercier, the government sold the
Ten Commandments monument and the land beneath it to the local
Eagles chapter that originally donated the monument422 without soliciting
other bids;423 similarly, in Chambers the government did so despite
having received higher bids.424 In Buono, without soliciting other bids,
the federal government transferred the cross and its surrounding land to
the Veterans of Foreign Wars, which initially erected the cross, and
exchanged land with Mr. Sandoz, the individual who erected the cross in
its current form.425 Also, in City of Marshfield, the government failed to
solicit bids426 and sold the Christ statue and land beneath it to the Henry
Praschak Memorial Fund, Inc.,427 established in honor of the person who
donated the picnic tables and grills for a comfort station around the
statue.428 Similarly, in Duchesne City, the government sold land along
with the monument of the Ten Commandments to the family that had
originally donated the monument.429
Selling the religious object to its donor most likely ensures that the
object will be maintained because the donor obviously attached
significance to the object in the first place. For instance, in Mercier, the
government made the “practical” decision to sell the religious monument
and the underlying land to the Eagles, the donor, as the government was
interested in having the monument maintained. The nearby location of
the monument to the Eagles chapter made its maintenance convenient for

422. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005).
423. Id. at 697.
424. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2005).
425. Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Buono IV, 527
F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
426. Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2000).
427. See id. at 489–90.
428. Id. (implying that the Henry Praschak Memorial Fund was so named because Henry
Praschak donated the picnic tables and grills surrounding the monument).
429. Summum v. Duchesne City, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1225 (D. Utah 2004), rev’d, 482 F.3d
1263 (10th Cir. 2007), vacated, 555 U.S. 1210 (2009).
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the Eagles.430 “It was a surprise to no one when the [Eagles] chose to
keep the monument in its present location.”431
Even if a restrictive covenant does not explicitly require the retention
of the religious object, any covenant requiring some type of maintenance
of the property likely suggests to a buyer that the government intends for
the status quo—including the religious object—to continue.
A
requirement to maintain any memorial, even if not the religious object,
structures an incentive for the new owner to maintain the current
religious object rather than expend funds to dismantle the current
memorial and erect a new one in its place.
In Paulson v. City of San Diego, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a prior
sale of a cross because the city’s consideration of the bid price and
financial capability to maintain the “historic war memorial” in selecting a
buyer gave an unfair advantage to those seeking to promote the city’s
sectarian message.432 The Ninth Circuit explained:
Suppose that two similarly situated bidders—Bidder # 1 and Bidder #
2—each had the minimum acceptable amount of $35,000 to bid on the
project, and Bidder # 1 proposed to retain the cross, while Bidder # 2
proposed to construct a secular memorial. The structure of the sale
ensured that Bidder # 1 would be awarded the land. Bidder # 1 could
bid the full $35,000 and still demonstrate the financial capability to
maintain a historic war memorial because the City would subsidize the
cost of Bidder # 1’s proposed memorial by conveying the cross. Bidder
# 2 could not compete successfully with Bidder # 1: If Bidder # 2
matched Bidder # 1’s bid, then Bidder # 2 could not demonstrate the
financial capability to maintain a historic war memorial, because all of
Bidder # 2’s resources would have been dedicated to the bid price, and
none would have been reserved to fund removal of the cross and
construction of a new memorial. Alternatively, Bidder # 2 could
reserve the money needed to remove the cross and construct the new
memorial. But that option would eliminate Bidder # 2 from the
process, because Bidder # 2’s bid in that instance would fall below the
minimum acceptable bid.433

Paulson demonstrates that when a governmental body conditions the sale
of land and a religious object on a particular use, bidders who are
430. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005).
431. Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1014 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (“Every La
Crosse citizen recognizes the sale to the Order [of the Eagles] was about preserving the monument’s
religious message in the park.”), rev’d sub nom. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 395,
693 (7th Cir. 2005).
432. 294 F.3d 1124, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2002).
433. Id. at 1133.
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interested in preserving the religious object receive for free the means to
continue the government’s sectarian message.434
Even assuming arguendo that a restrictive covenant cannot be
interpreted to require retention of the religious object, a restrictive
covenant that generally requires a particular use for the conveyed land
would still entangle the government. The Court has warned about
“programs, whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details of
administration.”435 In Lemon, the Court invalidated state aid to parochial
schools in part because the program entailed “continuing state
surveillance” to ensure compliance.436 Although the inspection in Lemon
related more specifically to religious content,437 a covenant that mandates
maintaining a memorial necessitates the government to monitor the
private owner’s compliance, which would continue state action in
perpetuity.
B. Reversionary Interests
The government further perpetuates state action when it retains a
reversionary interest in conveyed land because the land on which the
religious monument or memorial rests may revert to the government’s
ownership. Not only must the government monitor the new owner’s
compliance with the restrictive covenant, but it must also act to enforce
the covenant when the new owner fails to meet its obligation. A
reversionary interest in the land undermines the government’s
disassociation from the religious monument, which purportedly
motivated the land sale in the first place.
Imposing a requirement on the private owner to maintain the
property for a particular use would allow the government to retain
“complete present control.”438 For example, in Hampton v. City of
Jacksonville, a city sold golf courses that were previously segregated to
private owners for fair market value.439 Although there was no evidence
of bad faith,440 the court nonetheless found that state action continued

434. Id.
435. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S.
664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J., separate opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
436. Id. at 619.
437. See id. at 620.
438. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 1962).
439. Id. at 320.
440. Id. at 321.
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because the city included a reversionary clause in the sale that provided
the property would revert to the city if it were used for any purpose other
than a golf course.441 The court in Hampton considered such schemes
involving reversionary clauses as no different from a long term lease that
permits the government to cancel if the owner fails to carry out the
purpose.442
Additionally, entanglement may result from the government
retaining an easement on a parcel. In Buono, the government essentially
retained an easement over the newly privatized land.443 Section 8121 of
the land exchange legislation provides that “[n]otwithstanding the
conveyance of the property under this subsection, the Secretary shall
continue to carry out the responsibilities of the Secretary under such
section 8137.”444 The Secretary, pursuant to § 8137, must “use not more
than $10,000 of funds available for the administration of the Mojave
National Preserve to acquire a replica of the original memorial plaque
and cross placed at the national World War I memorial . . . and to install
the plaque in a suitable location on the grounds of the memorial.”445 The
government thereby retained at least an easement to allow it to install a
plaque, which evinced the government’s failure to sever its association
with this religious symbol. Because both a restrictive covenant to
maintain a memorial and a reversionary clause entails ongoing
government surveillance, the government should remove the religious
object to avoid government entanglement with religion.
C. Political Divisiveness
A land disposition without restrictive covenants or reversionary
interests could still excessively entangle the government because of
political divisiveness. As early as Everson v. Board of Education,446

441. Id. at 322.
442. Id. at 322–23.
443. See Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 780 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
444. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(a), 117 Stat.
1054, 1100 (2003).
445. Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from
and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(c),
115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2001).
446. 330 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (reviewing the constitutionality of
township’s reimbursement for transportation of children to parochial schools).
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members of the Court have recognized the divisive effect of religion in
the public sphere. As Justice Jackson articulated:
[T]he effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution
was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of
things which could directly or indirectly be made public business. . . .
It was intended not only to keep the states’ hands out of religion, but to
keep religion’s hands off the state, and, above all, to keep bitter
religious controversy out of public life . . . .448

In Lemon, the Court considered the potential for political divisiveness449
as part of its entanglement analysis: “A broader base of entanglement of
yet a different character is presented by the d[i]visive political potential
of these state programs.”450 The Lemon Court assumed that the issue of
state assistance for parochial schools would prompt substantial political
activity in a community with high enrollment in church-related
schools.451

448. Id.
449. For a discussion about the origins of the political divisiveness argument, see Richard W.
Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1681–83 (2006).
450. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971); see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,
417 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing that “the potential for such divisiveness” provided “a
strong additional reason” to invalidate the government’s programs), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 259 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (expressing concern for the “dangers of political ‘divisiveness on religious
lines’”), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973) (warning that competition among religious groups to
“gain or maintain the support of government” may “occasion[] considerable civil strife”); Walz v.
Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., separate opinion) (“What is at stake as a matter
of policy [in Establishment Clause cases] is preventing that kind and degree of government
involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a
political system to the breaking point.”).
451. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. Some argue that Justice Burger failed to buttress the political
divisiveness test in Lemon with any historical support. See, e.g., Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.,
Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and
Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 205, 214 (1981). But other scholars, though skeptical of the
entanglement test, have acknowledged that “the ‘excessive entanglement’ conception has long been
recognized as one of the core strengths of our democratic society. Madison recognized the
theoretical necessity of confining religion and civil government to their own respective spheres; de
Tocqueville observed the salutary consequences of adherence to that standard.” Ripple, supra note
409, at 1238 (footnote omitted). Likewise, Professor Richard Garnett traced the foundations for the
political divisiveness test to Madison, who warned “‘intermedd[ling] with Religion’ by government
can only ‘destroy . . . moderation and harmony’ and is an ‘enemy of the public quiet.’” Garnett,
supra note 449, at 1681 (alterations in original) (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785)).
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Some Justices have suggested that the entanglement prong should be
confined to administrative entanglement,452 but have acknowledged that
“[p]olitical divisiveness is admittedly an evil addressed by the
Despite appeals to eliminate political
Establishment Clause.”453
divisiveness as a factor, the support for a political divisiveness test can
be found in cases beyond its origins in parochial-aid situations.454 In one
such case, Lee v. Weisman, the Court invalidated nonsectarian school
prayers at a graduation.455 Although Justice Kennedy grounded his
opinion in Weisman in the dangers of coercion, the concept of political
divisiveness appeared to inform his discussion of a pluralistic society.456
Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, expressed fear that “mixing of
government and religion can be a threat to free government, even if no
one is forced to participate” and explained that “[o]nly ‘[a]nguish,
hardship and bitter strife’ result ‘when zealous religious groups
struggl[e] with one another to obtain the Government’s stamp of
approval.”457

452. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 n.7 (2002) (rejecting “the invisible
specters of ‘divisiveness’ and ‘religious strife’”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233–34 (1997)
(concluding that divisiveness and “administrative cooperation,” without more, were insufficient to
create entanglement); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that political divisiveness “should not be an independent test of constitutionality”). For
other criticisms of political divisiveness as a consideration in determining Establishment Clause
violations, see Clement, supra note 147, at 245; Gaffney, supra note 451, at 236 (arguing that the
political divisiveness test lacks historical support and promotes bad public policy and bad theology);
Garnett, supra note 449, at 1670 (concluding that although political divisiveness concerns are “real
and reasonable does not mean that they can or should supply the enforceable content of the First
Amendment’s prohibition on establishments of religion”); Ripple, supra note 409, at 1217 (arguing
that the entanglement standard is vulnerable to judicial subjectivity).
For scholarship supporting political divisiveness as a factor in Establishment Clause
evaluations, see Stephen M. Feldman, Divided We Fall: Religion, Politics, and the Lemon
Entanglements Prong, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 253, 260 (2009) (utilizing political theory, social
science, and history to defend the political divisiveness factor); David R. Scheidemantle, Note,
Political Entanglement as an Independent Test of Constitutionality Under the Establishment Clause,
52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1209, 1213 (1986) (“The political entanglement test should be capable of
striking down [politically divisive legislation] even if it passes scrutiny under the other prongs.”).
453. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Garnett, supra note 449, at
1700 (pointing out that Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test is similar to the political divisiveness
consideration).
454. See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom.
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
455. 505 U.S. 577, 584–86 (1992).
456. See Garnett, supra note 449, at 1701 (“The decision owes as much as any post-Lemon
opinion to claims and predictions about politics, division, and religion.”).
457. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 606–07 (Blackmum, J., concurring) (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962)).
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Similarly, political divisiveness is relevant to religious display cases.
In McCreary, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, was concerned
about the “civic divisiveness that follows when the Government weighs
in on one side of the religious debate.”458 In his controlling concurring
opinion in Van Orden, Justice Breyer focused on the Establishment
Clause’s “basic purpose[]” of “avoid[ing] that divisiveness based upon
religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government
and religion alike.”459 In that same case, Justice Stevens provided even
greater support for examining political divisiveness in Establishment
Clause cases by referring to the “Government’s obligation to avoid
divisiveness and exclusion in the religious sphere.”460 Most recently, the
Buono plurality implicitly acknowledged political divisiveness as a
consideration when it cited to the portion of Justice Breyer’s concurrence
in Van Orden that expressed fear that removing the Ten Commandments
monument could “create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness
that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”461
Although the Van Orden and Buono pluralities used it to justify
retaining the religious symbol, they nonetheless relied on political
divisiveness as a consideration. And as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky points
out, “[a]ccepting Breyer’s goal of preventing divisiveness should lead to
a robust application of the Establishment Clause—the opposite of his
conclusion in Van Orden.”462
Because “political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect,”463 the concern about political divisiveness should be relevant to
land disposition cases. “The argument for government agnosticism is
that, unlike government endorsement of any particular religious
proposition, it is not in principle impossible for everyone to agree to
it.”464 Government display of religious objects and the sale of land that
perpetuate the object’s presence are sources of tremendous divisiveness.
As Justice Brennan warned, “the Court should not blind itself to the fact

458. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 876 (2005).
459. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
460. Id. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
461. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817 (2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting Van Orden,
545 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
462. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 4 (2005).
463. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
464. Koppelman, supra note 237, at 735.
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that because communities differ in religious composition, the
controversy over whether local governments may adopt religious
symbols will continue to fester.”465 The dissent in Lynch pointed out that
although there was no apparent civil strife prior to the suit challenging
the government’s display of the crèche, the suit “unleashed powerful
emotional reactions which divided the City along religious lines.”466 The
cross in Trunk “has long since become a flashpoint of secular and
religious divisiveness,”467 engendering twenty years of litigation.
Similarly, in Jewish War Veterans of the United States v. United States,
“emotions were running high,” provoking over 3,200 letters about the
cross and “ignit[ing] a fuse among local residents” who used their
political strength to persuade their senator to act.468 In other cities, the
465. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 703–04 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
466. Id. at 702–03. The district court reviewed many letters from the community that reflected a
sentiment that the ACLU was engaging in “petty” behavior by initiating a law suit over a central
Christian symbol, rather than having the plaintiff who was offended by the crèche avoid the park
where the crèche was displayed. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.R.I. 1981), aff’d,
691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The majority of the letters expressed
outrage and indignation with the “minority’s” interference with the “majority’s” choice of objects to
display. Id. at 1161–62.
Ten local clergypersons jointly issued the following statement in response to the mayor’s
statements denouncing the legal challenge of the crèche:
We clergy of several religious traditions wish to express a pastoral concern growing out
of the controversy surrounding the display of a nativity scene with city funds in
Pawtucket. Our concerns are several noted below. While the festivities, lights and
generation of good will in this season have roots in both religion and secular tradition, the
cr[è]che is a specifically religious symbol. Our country, while deeply influenced by the
Judeo–Christian heritage, is not itself Judeo–Christian but is pluralistic, consisting of
many rich religious traditions and recognizing the value of all. Government in our
country, wisely recognizing the diversity of these traditions, was set up to steer clear of
embracing any, while protecting the religious freedom of all. We as pastors have a
responsibility to educate our people in the history of religious strife and the futility of
imposing religious beliefs on the human conscience. The specifically religious
observance of this holiday period belongs in our homes and in our churches and
synagogues. Although there are public recognitions of this glad season, they should be
confined to those symbols and traditions which are not identified with any one group.
We call upon our public officials not to exploit the strong sentiments associated with
religious festivals and divide majority from minority. Rather, we hope they will rise to a
statesperson-like position and avoid the insensitivity of foisting upon others any specific
religious traditions. In this way, the true joy of the season can be appreciated by and
made meaningful to the widest diversity of people.
Id. at 1160 n.17.
467. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom.
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012); see also Gonzales v. N. Twp., 4 F.3d
1412, 1415 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing ministerial associations’ objections to crucifix because “[t]he
religious symbol which was erected with the intention of uniting [the] community in reality has
proved divisive both between and within religious groups.” (alterations in original)).
468. 695 F. Supp. 3, 5–6 (D.D.C. 1988).
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battle over religious symbols aroused as many as 10,000 people to march
in the streets.469 As in Buono, the issue of preserving a religious symbol
can prompt immediate political activity, possibly extending beyond the
community to Congress. Congress reacted to the litigation in Buono over
the Latin cross by declaring the cross a memorial,470 twice prohibiting
public funds to be used for its removal to forestall compliance with the
district court injunction,471 appropriating $10,000 for a replica plaque,472
and passing the land exchange act.473
Perhaps the ACLU’s observation best describes the divisiveness of
government religious endorsement:
Of all the issues the ACLU takes on—reproductive rights,
discrimination, jail and prison conditions, abuse of kids in the public
schools, police brutality, to name a few—by far the most volatile issue
is that of school prayer. Aside from our efforts to abolish the death
penalty, it is the only issue that elicits death threats.474

In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,475 for example, although
the court tried to protect anonymous plaintiffs from harassment, once the
plaintiffs’ identities were discovered, someone made death threats and
killed their dog.476 In another case, plaintiffs who challenged religious
meetings in the public schools suffered harassment and the destruction of
their home.477 Even children have been the subjects of threats.478 One

469. Slaven, supra note 10, at 652–53.
470. Buono IV, 527 F.3d 758, 770 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Department of Defense and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on
the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002)), rev’d
and remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
471. Id. at 769 (quoting Consolidated Appropriations Act—FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §
133, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-230 (2000)); id. at 771 (quoting Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551 (2002)).
472. Id. at 770 (quoting Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002 § 8137).
473. Id. at 771 (quoting Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, §
8121(a)–(e), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003)).
474. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Michele A.
Parish, Graduation Prayer Violates the Bill of Rights, UTAH BAR. J., June/July 1991, at 19).
475. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
476. Laycock, supra note 206, at 1224.
477. See id. at 1225 (citing Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1397
(10th Cir. 1985)).
478. See Abby Goodnough, Student Faces Town’s Wrath in Protest Against Prayer, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, at A11–A12. I thank Professor Enrique Guerra Pujol for alerting me to this
case.
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newspaper reported that State Representative Peter G. Palumbo attacked
a teenage girl who challenged a school prayer poster, denouncing her on
a popular radio station as “an evil little thing.”479 As a result of the
threats she received, the teenager was only able to attend school under
police escort.480 In yet another school prayer case, a child had to be
relocated to another school.481
Thus, political divisiveness, whether the result of religion in the
schools or in the parks, is a genuine concern both to the safety of
religious nonadherents and of the government. As the Lemon Court
reminds us:
We have an expanding array of vexing issues, local and national,
domestic and international, to debate and divide on. It conflicts with
our whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion
Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our
elections that they could divert attention from the myriad issues and
problems that confront every level of government.482

This is not to insinuate that voter apathy is ideal. Some fear that
allowing judges to invalidate laws on the basis of political divisiveness
would hamper voter participation in the political process.483 The value of
the political divisiveness test, however, is its protection of religious
minorities and the political process by serving as a “‘warning signal’ of
other pitfalls under the ‘purpose’ or ‘effect’ standards.”484 “The very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials. . . . [Such] fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcomes of no elections.”485
Thus, whether manifested by political divisiveness or ongoing
government surveillance of compliance with reversionary clauses or

479. See id. at A11.
480. See id.
481. Laura S. Underkuffler, Through a Glass Darkly: Van Orden, McCreary, and the Dangers
of Transparency in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 59, 79 (2006)
(citing Neela Banerjee, Famillies Challenging Religious Influence in Delaware Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 29, 2006, at A10).
482. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
483. See Gaffney, supra note 451, at 232.
484. Ripple, supra note 409, at 1203 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
798 (1973); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624–25)).
485. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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restrictive covenants, government privatization of public land implicates
government entanglement with religion.
VII.CONCLUSION
The Establishment Clause should not be nullified by “evasive
schemes . . . whether attempted ‘ingeniously or ingenuously.’”486 Land
sales and transfers and exercise of eminent domain are ingenious ploys
governments use to avoid removing religious symbols from public land.
A review of the government’s purported secular purposes reveals that
they are a sham for preserving the government’s religious message.
Governmental bodies have justified land dispositions as a basis for
preserving a memorial or commemoration of secular events and ideals.
But these religious objects hold no unique connection to the events they
are intended to memorialize, and in fact may risk perpetuating sectarian
preferences. Governments can provide memorials and comply with the
Establishment Clause without the infusion of religion. Additionally,
concerns that removal of the religious object would show disrespect to
religion fails to account for the disrespect religious adherents feel over
the secularization of their revered symbols. Even if all religious
adherents would be offended by the object’s removal, “it does not follow
that the government can decline to cure an Establishment Clause
violation in order to avoid offense.”487 Therefore, governments lack a
predominantly secular interest in privatizing religious symbols and the
underlying land, which alone is enough to invalidate such actions under
the Lemon and endorsement tests.
Also, a reasonable observer would view privatization of public land
in lieu of removing the religious object as government endorsement of
religion. Herculean efforts488 exerted by the government, and the history
of religious activities that have occurred at the religious symbol’s site
contribute to the perception of government endorsement, which fencing
and disclaimers cannot mitigate. Restrictive covenants that require
maintenance of the symbol and reversionary clauses that entangle the
government in religion further magnify the perception of government
endorsement. Finally, coupled with the government speech doctrine,
486. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940)
(discussing children’s right to integrated schools)).
487. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1839 n.11 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
488. Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Buono IV, 527
F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
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privatization of religious symbols and their surrounding land would
enable the government to circumvent the Free Speech and Establishment
Clauses.
Thus, the best course of action that comports with the Constitution is
obvious—remove the religious symbol from public land. Removing the
religious symbol gives the greatest effect to the Establishment Clause by
accommodating the interests of the public, religious adherents, and
nonbelievers. The public land can and should be preserved for public
use instead of being carved up through privatization. Religious
adherents need not suffer the dilution of their sacred religious symbols
through government secularization, and nonbelievers may participate as
full members of society without the exclusionary message sent by land
dispositions.

